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Abstract 
We present the design of an IPv6 enabled wireless sensor network based 
on the IEEE 802.15.4 standard for medical monitoring. We design a routing 
mechanism for efficient flooding, a hop-by-hop error recovery and congestion 
control mechanism for reliable packet delivery and a lightweight security ar-
chitecture for the medical monitoring system. We extend the widely used Ex-
tensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) to employ the Generalized Pre-shared 
Key (GPSK) authentication method with some optimizations for securing the 
system. We use the 3-party EAP model with the Personal Area Network Coor-
dinator (PAN coordinator) of IEEE 802.15.4 standard as the EAP authenticator 
for authenticating sensor nodes within the radio range of the PAN coordinator. 
In order to use EAP authentication for a sensor node several hops away from 
the PAN coordinator, we define a new role (relay authenticator) for its coordi-
nator which tunnels EAP messages to the PAN coordinator securely. We define 
EAP message encapsulation for IEEE 802.15.4 networks and a key hierarchy 
for the security architecture. We have simulated the system and shown that 
EAP based authentication is feasible in wireless sensor networks. 
Contents 
Abstract iii 
Table of Contents iii 
List of Tables vii 
List of Figures ix 
Acknowledgments x 
1 Introduction 1 
1.1 WSN for Medical Monitoring 2 
1.2 Sensor Network Hardware 5 
1.2.1 The IEEE 802.15.4 Standard 6 
1.3 Contributions 9 
1.4 Outline 10 
2 Integrating IPv6 into Wireless Sensor Networks 12 
2.1 Requirements and Challenges 13 
2.2 IPv6 Adaptation for IEEE 802.15.4 Networks 14 
2.2.1 Fragmentation and Reassembly 15 
2.2.2 Header Compression 16 
2.2.3 Mesh Routing 18 
2.3 Network Architecture and Neighbor Discovery 19 
2.3.1 Bootstrapping 20 
2.3.2 Router and Prefix Discovery 20 
iii 
2.3.3 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration 21 
2.4 IP Security Protocol Support 23 
2.4.1 Securing Neighbor Discovery 24 
3 Mesh Routing and Reliable Transport 25 
3.1 Mesh Routing 26 
3.1.1 Proposed Mesh Routing Protocol 26 
3.1.2 Simulation Results 35 
3.2 Reliable Data Transport 38 
3.2.1 Proposed Reliable Transport Protocol 38 
4 Sensor Network Security 43 
4.1 Security Threats 43 
4.2 Security Requirements 44 
4.2.1 Data Confidentiality 44 
4.2.2 Data Integrity 45 
4.2.3 Source Authentication 45 
4.2.4 Replay Protection 45 
4.2.5 Access control 46 
4.2.6 Availability 46 
4.3 Security Building Blocks 46 
4.3.1 Data Encryption 46 
4.3.2 Message Integrity Code 48 
4.4 Authentication and Key Management 48 
4.4.1 Key Distribution Methods 48 
4.4.2 Authentication Methods 49 
4.5 WSN Security Protocols 52 
4.5.1 SPINS 52 
4.5.2 TinySec 53 
IV 
4.5.3 Sizzle 54 
4.5.4 Zigbee Security Architecture 55 
5 Authentication Framework for Sensor Networks 57 
5.1 Components of Proposed Architecture 58 
5.1.1 The Key Hierarchy 61 
5.1.2 IEEE 802.15.4 EAP Encapsulation 62 
5.2 Protocol Operations 64 
5.2.1 Authenticating First Hop Neighbors 64 
5.2.2 Authenticating Distant Nodes 69 
5.2.3 Mutual Authentication 71 
5.3 Implementation Issues 72 
5.4 Simulation Results 73 
5.4.1 EAP-GPSK Authentication Time 75 
5.4.2 3-Way Security Association Time 75 
5.4.3 Key Transport Time 75 
5.4.4 Network Access Time 76 
6 Conclusions 78 
6.1 Limitations 80 
6.2 Future Work 81 
Append ices 92 
A Users Manual 92 
A.l Installing Modules 92 
A.2 Simulating Routing Protocols 93 
A.3 Simulating Security Protocol 94 
B Simplified R D T Sender 96 
v 
C Simplified RDT Receiver 98 
D List of Acronyms 100 
List of Tables 
1.1 IEEE 802.15.4 MAC Security 9 
2.1 LoWPAN Dispatch Values 17 
2.2 LoWPAN HC1 Encoding for Address Fields 17 
2.3 HC1 Encoding for Next Header 18 
5.1 IEEE 802.1X Types of EAP Packets 64 
5.2 Different EAP Packets 64 
vn 
List of Figures 
1.1 Typical Sensor Network Architecture 2 
1.2 International 10-20 System of EEG Electrode Placement 3 
1.3 IEEE 802.15.4 Star and Peer-to-Peer Topology 7 
1.4 IEEE 802.15.4 Cluster Tree Topology 8 
2.1 LoWPAN IP Fragmentation 15 
2.2 LoWPAN Header Compression 16 
2.3 LoWPAN Mesh Header Formats 18 
2.4 IPv6 Addresses Autoconfiguration 21 
2.5 IPv6 Multicast Address Mapping 23 
3.1 IEEE 802.15.4 Mesh PAN Architecture 25 
3.2 The MCDS Tree for the Network of Fig. 3.1 27 
3.3 Broadcast Tree Construction (Hop 1) 29 
3.4 Broadcast Tree Construction (Hop 2) 29 
3.5 Broadcast Tree Construction (Hop 3) 31 
3.6 The Optimized Broadcast Tree 31 
3.7 Optimized Multicast Tree Formation 33 
3.8 Sizes of Broadcast Trees 36 
3.9 Sizes of Multicast Trees 37 
3.10 Communication Complexity of Broadcast Tree Construction 38 
3.11 Time Complexity of Broadcast Tree Construction 39 
viii 
3.12 Redundant Retransmissions 40 
3.13 RDT Congestion Control 42 
4.1 GPSK EAP Authentication Exchanges 51 
5.1 Components of Proposed Authentication Model 59 
5.2 Proposed Key Hierarchy 61 
5.3 LoWPAN EAP Encapsulation 63 
5.4 EAP Authentication for PAN Coordinator's Neighbors 65 
5.5 EAP-Request/GPSK-1 Packet 66 
5.6 EAP-Response/GPSK-2 Packet 66 
5.7 EAP-Request/GPSK-3 Packet 67 
5.8 EAP-Response/GPSK-4 Packet 67 
5.9 EAP-Key/SA-1 Packet 68 
5.10 EAP-Key/SA-2 Packet 68 
5.11 EAP-Key/SA-3 Packet 69 
5.12 EAP Authentication for Distant Nodes 70 
5.13 EAP-GPSK Authentication Time 74 
5.14 3-Way Security Association Time 75 
5.15 Key Transport Time 76 
5.16 Network Access Time 76 
ix 
Acknowledgments 
I would like to give my deepest thanks to my supervisors Prof. Behcet Sarikaya and 
Prof. Liang Chen, who influenced me most during my years at the University of 
Northern British Columbia. Throughout my two year's studying and researching, 
they gave me effective guidance with their knowledgeable suggestions. From them, 
I learnt how to develop new ideas from the papers, how to analyze and simulate 
network protocols, and how to write a well structured paper. I feel grateful to them 
for any future success I may have. 
I also want to thank to Dr. Siamak Rezaei and Dr. Moustafa Mohamed for their 
suggestions and comments on this thesis. These valuable comments helped a lot to 
complete this thesis. 
Finally I will give my deep appreciation and thanks to my parents Maser Ali and 
Abiron Nesa and to my wife Melava Sarmin, for sharing their unconditional love with 
me and giving me the courage for pursuing my research goals at UNBC. 
x 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Wireless sensor networking (WSN) is one of the most exciting and challenging research 
areas of recent time. A number of independent low-cost, low-power, battery-operated 
nodes, communicating wirelessly over limited frequency and bandwidth constitutes 
a wireless sensor network [1]. These sensor nodes run TinyOS [2], an event-driven 
operating system for networked applications in wireless embedded systems. The de-
ployment of wireless sensor networks is becoming more common in a wide variety 
of applications for collecting and disseminating sensitive and important information 
due to their low cost, deployment flexibility and mobility support. Some of the most 
common applications include environmental and habitats monitoring, medical mon-
itoring, disaster management, infrastructure and seismic monitoring, traffic control, 
industrial plant monitoring etc. Fig. 1.1 shows a typical sensor network deployment 
architecture for monitoring applications such as patient monitoring. The increas-
ing number of applications and resource constraints of WSNs emerge a number of 
research issues such as power management, network discovery, control and routing, 
reliable transport, integration to the Internet, collaborative signal and information 
processing, tasking and querying, and security are all currently under research. 
Chapter 1. Introduction 2 
Figure 1.1: Typical Sensor Network Architecture 
1.1 WSN for Medical Monitoring 
Medical monitoring using wireless sensor network has the potential to offer better 
quality of healthcare services to an increased number of patients [3] [4]. Wireless 
patient monitoring involves measurement and digitization of vital signs (e.g. BP, 
EKG, respiration rate, pulse, and oxygen saturation), transmission of packets over 
wireless networks, and delivery of complete information to one of more healthcare 
professionals. For the last few years, a number of research projects has been exploring 
wireless sensor networks for medical services like continuous patient monitoring and 
providing emergency medical care in disasters. For example, the wireless sensor based 
patient monitoring system, Ayushman [5], collects real-time health information in 
diverse scenarios, from home based monitoring to disaster relief. CodeBlue [6] extends 
wireless sensor networks applications for emergency medical services in disasters. In 
[7], we have designed a wireless medical sensor network for recognizing mental states 
based on Electroencephalograms (EEG) recordings. 
Wireless EEGs consist of EEG sensors, electrodes, digitizing equipment with wire-
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less interface providing connection to a personal computer or to a Personal Digital 
Assistant (PDA). EEG sensors are connected to well-defined parts of the human scalp 
(see Fig. 1.2) to collect brain signals. Brain signals from each sensor (channel) are 
digitized at 250 Hz with 16 bits implying a data rate of 4 kbps per channel. In 
a recent clinical trial, it has been proved that four-channel wireless EEG quality is 
acceptable and feasible to perform in the hospital emergency rooms [8]. The IEEE 
802.15.4 standard is designed for applications that require low data rate, low power 
consumption, low cost, self-organization, and flexible topologies which makes it most 
suitable communications protocol for use in wireless sensor networking [9]. The IEEE 
802.15.4 radio supports a minimum data rate of 20 kbps and a maximum data rate 
of 250 kbps and can be used to transport EEG data. 
Figure 1.2: International 10-20 System of EEG Electrode Placement 
In [7], we have designed a combined software and hardware platform for medical 
sensor networks like the CodeBlue [10]. We have designed EEG sensors with Tmote 
Sky [11] motes, which employ the IEEE 802.15.4 radio and 12-bit analog to digital 
conversion hardware. EEG data, gathered and posted online by Z. Keirn [12], have 
been stored in Tmote's flash memory to be used as an EEG sensor. The system 
consists of a number of EEG sensor nodes, a base station, and a backend server. 
We have used a Stargate [13] single-board microcomputer with a Tmote as the base 
station; Stargates have the processing power and memory capabilities of a typical 
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PDA. 
A spanning tree-based multi-hop routing protocol is used to disseminate queries 
to sensor nodes and sensor readings to the base station. A reliable data transport 
protocol is used to disseminate queries to sensor nodes and sensor readings to the 
base station reliably [14]. The system uses a simple query processor similar to the 
CodeBlue's CBQ, that takes queries of the form (S, C,p), where S is the set of subjects 
that should report data for this query, C is the count of the total number of samples 
and can be left unspecified to obtain the samples continuously and p is the filter 
predicate. We have added additional queries to the system by incorporating machine 
learning module for mental state recognition. The query predicates can specify the 
mental task being performed by a subject, for example (S, ,p = T), where T is a 
mental state. For this type of query, the query processor sends a query to the motes 
for subject S and the data received from motes are then forwarded to the machine 
learning subsystem for recognition. 
EEG signals are usually contaminated by eye movements, eye blinks, and muscular 
activities and therefore, we need to remove these artifacts from samples collected by 
electrodes before analyzing EEG signals. We have used the Independent Component 
Analysis (ICA) [15] in order to remove artifacts from the EEG data collected from 
sensors. The ICA method is based on the assumptions that the time series recorded 
on the scalp are spatially stable mixtures of the activities of temporally independent 
cerebral and artifactual sources, that the summation of potentials arising from differ-
ent parts of the brain, scalp, and body is linear at the electrodes, and that propagation 
delays from the sources to the electrodes are negligible. We have extracted frequency 
components (i.e. features) from the clean EEG data after removing artifacts. 
Two-second long segments of the time signal which overlap one second have used 
to compute the power spectrum with a short time Fourier transformation. This gives 
one feature per second and frequency band of 1/2 Hz. We have used a modified Mel 
Frequency Cepstral Coefficient (MFCC) [16], which has linear frequency spacing be-
low 80Hz and logarithmic spacing above 80Hz. Feature values for different frequency 
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bands might have different ranges and they might fluctuate differently. However, 
large fluctuations do not necessarily mean a large importance for classification [17] 
and therefore a simple normalization technique is used on training and test data sets. 
On training and test data sets, mean and variance are calculated for each electrode 
and each frequency band, which are then used for mean subtraction and variance 
normalization. 
We have implemented a Bayesian network [18] machine learning algorithm to 
recognize mental states from EEG features, which calculates the probabilities of vari-
ations in EEG signals by using mixture of Gaussian family of distributions. The 
classifier calculates the likelihood of each input signal to categorize it into a class of 
mental state, where EEG features are the evidence and the calculated probabilities 
form the hypothesis for classification, for further information see [7]. 
1.2 Sensor Network Hardware 
Wireless sensor devices called motes, consist of a Central Processing Unit (CPU), 
low-power radio, a power source, optional sensing elements and a modest amount of 
local storage in several cubic inch package. For example, the Berkeley Mica2 motes 
use an 8MHz 8-bit Atmel ATMEGA128L CPU with 128 KB of instruction memory, 
4 KB of random access memory (RAM) for data, and 512 KB of flash memory [19]. 
Mica2 offers a low-power single-chip radio from Chipcon (CC1000), that operates 
at 433 MHz or 916 MHz and delivers up to 76.8 kbps application bandwidth with 
an indoor range of approximately 20 to 30 meters. Recently, Moteiv has brought 
the next-generation mote platform, Tmote Sky, for extremely low-power and high 
data-rate sensor network applications [11]. Tmote Sky uses 8MHz Texas Instruments 
16-bit reduced instruction set computer (RISC) processor (MSP430) with on-chip 10 
KB of RAM, 48 KB of flash memory, the IEEE 802.15.4 radio, and an integrated 
on-board antenna providing 250 kbps data rate at 2.4 GHz with up to 125 meter 
range. 
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The resource scarcity of wireless sensor networks requires minimizing resource 
usage while providing better quality services. Communications infrastructure plays 
an important role in the success of wireless sensor networks because it affects the 
network architecture, data rates, network size, span, power management and security 
protocols. Bluetooth [20] (IEEE 802.15.1) is the first well-known standard designed 
low data rate applications. Bluetooth provides efficient channel hopping and high 
throughputs but requires expensive synchronization. During piconet formation, the 
master node must be in high-power scanning mode and Bluetooth radio consumes 
hundreds of milliwatts of power [20]. The complexity of Bluetooth makes it expensive 
and requires relatively high operating power and therefore unsuitable for use with 
low-cost and low-power wireless sensor networking applications. 
1.2.1 The IEEE 802.15.4 Standard 
The IEEE 802.15.4 Wireless Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer 
(PHY) Specifications for Low-Rate Wireless Personal Area Networks (LR-WPAN) 
[9] defines wireless personal area networks (WPANs) for small, inexpensive, power-
efficient, short-range wireless devices. The main objectives of an LR-WPAN are 
ease of installation without or little infrastructure, reliable data transfer, short-range 
operation, and extremely low cost and reasonable battery life, whilst maintaining a 
simple and flexible protocol. The IEEE 802.15.4 supports simple devices that consume 
minimal power and typically operate in the Personal Operating Space (POS) of 10 
meters or less. LR-WPAN supports one-hop star topology and multi-hop peer-to-peer 
topology (see Fig. 1.3) to meet the requirements of different applications. 
In the star topology, the communication is established between devices and a 
single central controller, called the PAN coordinator. The PAN coordinator is the 
primary controller of the network. The peer-to-peer topology also has a PAN coor-
dinator, however devices may communicate with any other device as long as they 
are in range of one another. Peer-to-peer topology allows ad-hoc, self-organizing and 
self-healing network topology such as mesh networking topology and requires mesh 
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routing functionalities to forward messages from one device to another inside the 
PAN. 
S t a r Topology Peer- to-Peer Topology 
Figure 1.3: IEEE 802.15.4 Star and Peer-to-Peer Topology 
The IEEE 802.15.4 defines two types of devices that may participate in an LR-
WPAN: full functionality devices (FFDs) and reduced functionality devices (RFDs). 
FFDs can communicate with any other neighboring node in the PAN and may become 
a network coordinator, whereas RFDs can communicate only with its coordinator and 
therefore must associate with a coordinator in both topologies. 
Each time a coordinator wakes up, it transmits a network beacon frame to inform 
other nodes that it is awake, the super-frame duration, and the next time a beacon 
will be sent, known as the beacon duration. After receiving a beacon from a coordi-
nator, other devices may synchronize to the schedule of the coordinator and request 
to associate. Following notification from the coordinator that the association was 
successful, associated nodes may send data to the coordinator after its beacon. In 
the other direction, coordinators advertise data they have for associated nodes in the 
payload of their beacon message. Nodes may then request data from the coordinator, 
who then sends the data. In the peer-to-peer topology, FFDs must listen to beacons 
from other nodes to communicate with them. A device in an LR-WPAN can use 
either a 64-bit IEEE extended address (EUI-64) or a 16-bit short address assigned 
during the association procedure. 
The peer-to-peer topology allows to form a larger network and a special case of 
Coordinator 
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Figure 1.4: IEEE 802.15.4 Cluster Tree Topology 
it is a cluster tree network where non-leaf nodes are FFDs. An RFD connects to a 
cluster tree network as a leaf device at the end of a branch, because RFDs do not 
allow other devices to associate. Any of the FFDs may act as a coordinator and 
provide synchronization services to other devices or other coordinators. Only one 
of these coordinators can be the overall PAN coordinator, which may have greater 
computational resources than any other device(s) in the PAN. If the PAN coordinator 
permits the device to join, it adds the new device as a child device in its neighbor 
list. Then the newly joined device adds the PAN coordinator as its parent in its 
neighbor list and begin transmitting periodic beacons; other candidate devices may 
then join the network at that device. The simplest form of a cluster tree network is a 
single cluster network, but larger networks are possible by forming a mesh of multiple 
neighboring clusters (see Fig. 1.4). In cluster tree networks, each PAN is identified 
by using a 16-bit PAN ID. 
The IEEE 802.15.4 Security 
The IEEE 802.15.4 standard specifies a number of security suites based on symmetric-
key cryptography to provide data confidentiality, data authenticity, and replay pro-
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tection at the link layer [9]. An application needs to set its security requirements by 
setting the appropriate parameters into the radio stack. If the application does not 
set any parameters then, by default, there is no security enabled. 
Security Level 
None 
MIC-32 
MIC-64 
MIC-128 
ENC 
ENC-MIC-32 
ENC-MIC-64 
ENC-MIC-128 
Description 
No Security 
4-octet Message Integrity Code (MIC) 
8-octet Message Integrity Code 
16-octet Message Integrity Code 
Encryption Only 
Encryption with 4-octet MIC 
Encryption with 8-octet MIC 
Encryption with 16-octet MIC 
Table 1.1: IEEE 802.15.4 MAC Security 
The IEEE 802.15.4 defines 8 different levels of security to provide varying levels 
of data authenticity and for optional data confidentiality on a frame-by-frame basis. 
The first of these provides no security, the next three are for message integrity pro-
tection, followed by encryption only, and finally the last three are for encryption and 
authentication (see Table 1.1). All of the above security alternatives but the first 
always provide replay protection. However, it does not define authentication and key 
exchange mechanism due to the large number of targeted application areas. 
1.3 Contributions 
This thesis makes a number of contributions toward the integration of IPv6 into 
low-power sensor devices and securing wireless medical sensor networks: 
• Developed an efficient broadcast tree construction protocol and adapted on-
demand routing protocols to minimize the number of retransmissions required 
for flooding a packet inside the WPAN. A hop-by-hop error recovery mechanism 
is employed for reliable frame delivery inside the WPAN to detect packet loss 
as early as possible and hence to minimize the communications overhead. 
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• Designed a security architecture for wireless medical sensor networks on top of 
IEEE 802.15.4 security primitives by defining authentication and key manage-
ment mechanisms. We also define the key hierarchy for the proposed security 
architecture. 
• Developed an authentication framework for wireless sensor networks to protect 
unauthorized devices to access the network. We extend the 3-party EAP au-
thentication for multi-hop WPAN architecture and optimize the GPSK EAP 
method for low-power wireless sensor networks. 
1.4 Outline 
The remainder of this thesis is organized into 5 chapters exploring the integration of 
IPv6 in low-power wireless networks, efficient routing protocols for the wireless mesh, 
and optimal security solution for wireless sensor networks. 
Chapter 2 discusses the integration of IPv6 into low-power wireless sensor net-
works. The subjects covered in this chapter include required IPv6 functionalities 
and challenges in implementing these features in low-power wireless sensor networks. 
Then how these features can be incorporated into low-power wireless networks are 
discussed in detail. 
Chapter 3 presents mesh routing and reliable data transport protocols for low-
power wireless networks. First, we introduce the optimized broadcast tree construc-
tion algorithm followed by on-demand mesh routing protocol on top of the broadcast 
tree. We also present some simulation results for evaluating the performance of our 
protocols. Second, we present an efficient implementation of reliable data transport 
protocol for wireless sensor networks. 
In Chapter 4, we discuss security architectures for wireless sensor networks. First, 
we present the security threats, requirements, and challenges of implementing security 
solution for low-power wireless sensor networks. Then we discuss the security prim-
itives that can be implemented on resource-constrained sensor devices and security 
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services available in IEEE 802.15.4 devices. Finally, we present an overview of the 
security architecture that has been proposed for low-power wireless sensor networks. 
In Chapter 5, we present an authentication and key management framework for 
low-power wireless sensor networks. First, we present the architectural components 
of the security framework, an EAP encapsulation for IEEE 802.15.4 networks, and a 
key hierarchy. Then we discuss the authentication and key management procedure for 
devices joining the network and finally, we present simulation results for performance 
evaluation. 
Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the accomplishments of this study and relates them 
to the wider field. Some improvements are suggested as future avenues of research. 
Chapter 2 
Integrating IPv6 into Wireless 
Sensor Networks 
The increasing applications of wireless sensor networks necessitates the connectivity 
of WSNs to the Internet. Although it is possible to connect WSNs to the Internet 
by using some sort of proxies (e.g. the serial forwarder of TinyOS [2]), but they 
do not provide seamless access to sensors and have the problem of single point of 
failure. In addition, proxies violate the end-to-end communication paradigm of the 
Internet, accompanied by problems similar to Network Address Translation (NAT). 
Furthermore deploying a non-IP communication approach means the need for devel-
oping new control and communication protocols that were already standardized for 
IP communication [21]. 
Many sensor network applications require seamless access to the sensors and perva-
sive monitoring capabilities. However, sensor networking has raised diverse challenges 
to researchers due to its wireless nature, node density, limited resources (e.g. bat-
tery power, processing capacity, and storage memory), low reliability of the nodes, 
and mobile distributed architecture different from those of classical mobile ad-hoc 
networks (MANET) [22]. Zuniga et al., [23] points that the implementation of IP 
stack in WSNs could not be viable due to computational limitations and low mem-
ory resources of sensor nodes. In contrast, the author in [24] proves the opposite 
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by constructing a model that permits full TCP/ IP stack, designated as /xIP, to be 
executed in 8-bit micro-controllers. In [21], authors investigated the required IPv6 
functions and protocols for IP-enabled sensor networks and designed a system for 
disaster management. 
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has formed a working group, IPv6 
over Low power WPAN (6L0WPAN) [25], to identify challenges and goals of incorpo-
rating IPv6 into LR-WPAN [26] and to define IPv6 functionalities for LR-WPAN [25] 
[27]. A number of companies (e.g. Sensinode Ltd. [28] and Arch Rock Corp. [29]) 
already manufacturing sensor devices with IPv6 support. In [30], David E. Culler 
presents the technological advancement toward implementation of IPv6 in low-power 
wireless devices of all kinds and their connectivity to the Internet like Wi-Fi. 
2.1 Requirements and Challenges 
Wireless sensor networks commonly use the IEEE 802.15.4 PHY and MAC layer 
protocols and therefore IPv6 operation has to be specified for it. The IEEE 802.15.4 
MAC layer leaves only 81 octets after link-layer security for upper layer, which is 
far below the minimum length of 1280 octets of an IPv6 packet[31]. Furthermore 
the IPv6 header without additional extension headers is of 40 octets and the user 
datagram protocol (UDP) uses 8-octet and the transmission control protocol (TCP) 
uses 20-octet header. Therefore, a fragmentation and reassembly adaptation layer 
must be provided at the layer below the IP layer. It is also important to use header 
compression for efficient transmission of IPv6 packets over IEEE 802.15.4 networks. 
To increase the size of the sensor network, sensor networks are expected to form a 
multi-hop ad hoc network in which IP packets need to be routed to their destinations. 
Furthermore, sensor devices could be mobile, that is, nodes may enter or leave the 
network at any time or just move around. Therefore, an ad hoc on-demand routing 
protocol is required to create a virtual single-link broadcast network below the IPv6 
layer, which is important for applying standard IPv6 functionalities like neighbor 
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discovery and stateless address autoconfiguration. 
To communicate with other devices using IP stack, a sensor node needs to be 
configured with an IP address. Since sensor networks may consist of hundreds of 
nodes and they are deployed in an ad hoc fashion, stateless address autoconfiguration 
[32] is necessary to reduce the configuration overhead on hosts. 
Integrating wireless sensor networks into the Internet requires extra attention 
to security mechanisms including confidentiality, integrity protection, authentication, 
authorization and access control, intrusion detection, denial of service prevention, etc. 
The Internet Security protocol (IPSec) [33] is mandatory to run IPv6, however power 
constraints and limited processing capability of sensor devices make IPSec compu-
tation intensive and the Internet Key Exchange protocol (IKE) [34] communication 
intensive. Thus IP enabled sensor networks need to define efficient keying methods 
to reduce communications overhead by minimizing per packet overhead and of course 
the number of signaling messages. 
2.2 IPv6 Adaptat ion for IEEE 802.15.4 Networks 
The IETF 6L0WPAN working group defines the LoWPAN encapsulation of IPv6 
packets for the IEEE 802.15.4 MAC protocol data unit. IPv6 packets to be trans-
ported over IEEE 802.15.4 networks are prefixed by an encapsulation header stack. 
Each header in the header stack contains a header type (e.g. Mesh, Broadcast, Frag-
mentation) followed zero or more header fields. The dispatch header identifies a 
LoWPAN packet and the Dispatch field is used to differentiate subsequent fields. 
The mesh header is used by the mesh routing protocol for forwarding a frame toward 
the destination in the PAN. The fragmentation header is used for transporting large 
IP packets using fragmentation and reassembly mechanism. 
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2.2.1 Fragmentation and Reassembly 
If an IPv6 packet does not fit within a single IEEE 802.15.4 MAC frame, the 6LoW-
PAN adaptation layer breaks the packet into link fragments and uses the fragmenta-
tion header. The first fragment contains the fragment header with the first three bits 
set to 110 followed by the datagram size (11 bits) followed by the datagram tag (16 
bits). The subsequent fragments contains fragmentation header with the first three 
bits set to 111 followed by the datagram size, followed by the datagram tag followed 
by datagram offset (8 bits). The datagram tag and the datagram size must be the 
same for all fragments of an IPv6 packet. Fig. 2.1 shows the fragmentation header 
formats. 
1 1 0 0 0 datagram size datagram tag 
(a) LoWPM Fragment Header (First Fragment) 
1 1 1 0 0 datagram size datagram tag datagram offset 
(b) LoWPMI Fragment Header (Subsequent Fragments) 
Figure 2.1: LoWPAN IP Fragmentation 
A receiver node uses the source address, the destination address, the datagram 
size and the datagram tag to identify all the fragments that belong to a given IPv6 
packet. When a node receives the first fragment, it starts the reassembly process and 
starts reassembly timer. The receiver buffers received fragments and constructs the 
IPv6 packet by concatenating fragments based on the datagram offset field for each 
fragment. The size of the reassembled packet must be equal to the datagram size. If 
any fragment overlaps with any other fragment, or the size of the reassembled packet 
does not comply with the datagram size, or reassembly timer expires, the receiver 
discards the packet. 
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2.2.2 Header Compression 
Communication protocols use packet headers to help applications to communicate 
over large distances connected by multiple links or hops in the network. However, as 
long as the applications are communicating most of this information carried in packet 
headers remains the same or changes in specific patterns. By observing the fields that 
remain constant or change in specific patterns it is possible either not to send them 
in each packet or to represent them in a smaller number of bits, which is described as 
header compression (HC). The process of header compression uses the concept of flow 
context, which is a collection of information about field values and change patterns 
of field values in the packet header. This context is formed on the compressor and 
the decompressor side for each packet flow. The first few packets of a newly identified 
flow are used to build the context on both sides and are sent without compression. 
Dispatch Header Payload 
{a} LoWPAH Encapsulation 
HCl Encoding Non-compressed Fields Payload 
(b) LOWPAN_HCi Encoded Header 
Figure 2.2: LoWPAN Header Compression 
The IEEE 802.15.4 association procedure gathers some state information and can 
be used to compress the following common IPv6 header fields onset: version, link-
local IPv6 source and destination addresses, the lower order 64 bits of IPv6 address 
which can be generated from the link layer addresses, the packet length which can be 
computed either from the Frame Length field of IEEE 802.15.4 MAC header or from 
the datagram size field of the fragment header, Traffic Class and Flow Label which 
are zero, and Next Header which is either User Datagram Protocol (UDP), Internet 
Control and Management Protocol (ICMP) or Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). 
Only the Hop Limit field of the IPv6 header needs to be sent always in full. Thus 
common IPv6 header can be compressed to 2 octets, 1 octet for the HCl Encoding 
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and 1 octet for the Hop Limit, instead of 40 octets. Such a packet is compressible 
via the LOWPAN.HC1 format by using a header dispatch type of LOWPAN.HCl 
followed by a dispatch header encoded using the HCl Encoding as shown in Fig. 2.2. 
This header may be preceded by a fragmentation header, which may be preceded by 
a mesh header. Table 2.1 presents the Dispatch values defined by the 6L0WPAN 
adaptation layer. 
Dispatch 
NALP 
IPv6 
LOWPAN_HCl 
LOWPAN.BC0 
ESC 
Dispatch Header 
Not a LoWPAN frame 
Non-compressed IPv6 header 
HCl encoded IPv6 header 
LoWPAN broadcast header 
More Dispatch 
Table 2.1: LoWPAN Dispatch Values 
The HCl Encoding uses 1 octet for encoding the IPv6 header. The IPv6 address 
fields are encoded by HCl Encoding with 4 bits, source address with bits 0 and 1 
and destination address with bits 2 and 3, and are interpreted as shown in Table 
2.2, where PI means prefix carried in-line, PC means prefix compressed, II means 
interface identifier (IID) carried in-line, and IC means IID compressed. 
Traffic Class and Flow Label are encoded using bit 4; a 0 indicates that they are 
not compressed and a 1 indicates that both of them are zero. The Next Header is 
encoded using bits 5 and 6 as shown in Table 2.3. A 0 for the bit 7 of the HCl 
Encoding indicates no more header compression bits and a 1 indicates that the HCl 
Encoding is immediately followed by more header compression bits according to HC2 
Encoding format, for more information see [25]. Non-compressed IPv6 header fields 
can be sent instead of the entire IPv6 header, which offer different degrees of header 
bits 0-1/2-3 
00 
01 
10 
11 
Encoding 
PI 
PI 
PC 
PC 
II 
IC 
II 
IC 
Table 2.2: LoWPAN HCl Encoding for Address Fields 
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bits 5-6 
00 
01 
10 
11 
Meaning 
Non-compressed 
UDP 
ICMP 
TCP 
Table 2.3: HC1 Encoding for Next Header 
compression. 
2.2.3 Mesh Routing 
Wireless sensor networks are usually multi-hop networks, therefore IP packets (e.g. 
for neighbor discovery) to be delivered inside the WPAN need to use mesh routing. 
However, the IEEE 802.15.4 specification [9] does not define such capability. The 
IETF 6L0WPAN working group defines mesh delivery header (see Fig. 2.3) to enable 
mesh routing in IEEE 802.15.4 networks, so that FFDs can employ some mesh routing 
protocol to populate their routing tables. 
I 1 I 0 I 0 I F [ HopsLef t I Originator | Final Destination | 
(a) h o m m Mesh Header 
I 1 I 0 I 0 I F [ HopsLeft [ Originator | Final Destination | LOWPfiN BCO | Sequence Number | 
[b) LoKPftH Broadcast Header 
Figure 2.3: LoWPAN Mesh Header Formats 
The mesh type is indicated by the first two bits (10) of the header and two bit 
fields, O and F, are used to indicate address types for the originator node and the 
final destination node. A 0 for O or F indicates that the address is an IEEE 64-bit 
extended address (EUI-64) and a 1 indicates that the address is a 16-bit short address. 
The HopsLeft is a 4-bit field to be used as hops count for route discovery or data for-
warding. Each node decrements the HopsLeft before sending a mesh frame towards 
its next hop and if HopsLeft reaches zero, the frame is discarded. The Originator 
is the link-layer address of the originator of the frame and the Final Destination is 
Chapter 2. Integrating IPv6 into Wireless Sensor Networks 19 
the link-layer address of the intended destination of the frame. 
When a node has a packet to send to a destination that is not in its radio range, it 
includes a mesh delivery header with the Originator set to its own link-layer address, 
and the Final Destination set to the packet's ultimate destination address. It sets 
the source address in the IEEE 802.15.4 header to its own link-layer address, puts the 
forwarder's link-layer address in the IEEE 802.15.4 header's destination address field 
and transmits the packet. When a node receives a mesh frame, it looks at the mesh 
header's Final Destination field to determine the actual destination. If the node 
itself is the ultimate destination, it consumes the packet otherwise it decrements the 
HopsLeft by one, and if the result is zero, discards the packet. If HopsLeft is 
greater than zero, the node employs mesh routing to determine the next hop towards 
the ultimate destination and puts that address in the destination address field of the 
IEEE 802.15.4 header. Finally, the node changes the source address in the IEEE 
802.15.4 header to its own link-layer address and transmits the packet. 
For IPv6 broadcast and multicast packets, a broadcast header is added immedi-
ately following the mesh header. The broadcast header consists of a LOWPAN.BC0 
dispatch followed by an 8-bit Sequence Number field which is used to detect duplicate 
packets (see Fig. 2.3). 
2.3 Network Architecture and Neighbor Discovery 
As discussed in Chapter 1, IEEE 802.15.4 networks support star, peer-to-peer and 
cluster-tree topologies. In all deployment architectures, the WPAN is controlled by 
a special node called PAN coordinator. Mesh routing in peer-to-peer and cluster-tree 
topologies make all nodes on-link neighbors to the PAN coordinator virtually. We 
assume that a WPAN maps to a specific IPv6 link and that the PAN coordinator 
acts as the default IPv6 router for all nodes of the WPAN. 
The IEEE 802.15.4 standard defines two addressing modes, the IEEE 64-bit ex-
tended address (EUI-64) and 16-bit short address for WPAN devices. A 16-bit short 
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address can be used after a successful association with a coordinator and is unique 
within the WPAN. An EUI-64 address can be mapped to an IPv6 address trivially, 
since these addresses never change for a given node. To use a 16-bit short address as 
a link-layer address and to generate Interface ID (IID) from it, IPv6 needs to take 
extra caution for stateless address autoconfiguration (SAA), neighbor unreachability 
detection (NUD) and duplicate address detection (DAD) because it can be changed 
over time. Since the IEEE 802.15.4 devices do not support link-layer multicast, IPv6 
multicast packets will be carried as link-layer broadcast frames inside WPANs. 
2 .3 .1 B o o t s t r a p p i n g 
An IPv6 node requires at least the default router's address and IPv6 prefixes in 
order to communicate with others using Internet Protocol. The process of obtaining 
this information is called bootstrapping. This could be done either manually or via 
autoconfiguration without user intervention. Since sensor networks can have hundreds 
of nodes, it is almost impossible to configure them manually. Furthermore, since 
sensor networks are expected to be deployed in ad hoc manner and nodes may be 
mobile, it is important to use autoconfiguration in network partition or merge events 
due to mobility of nodes. 
A node requires a link-local IP address to communicate with on-link nodes, but 
link-local addresses cannot be used to communicate with off-link nodes. In order to 
communicate with nodes in the Internet, a sensor node has to perform the gateway 
discovery to obtain the address of the default router. Sometimes additional configu-
ration information may be required to access specific services (e.g. the IP addresses 
of DNS servers) and can be configured automatically using service discovery. 
2.3.2 Router and Prefix Discovery 
IPv6 uses Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) [32] to find neighboring routers and to 
retrieve prefixes and other configuration parameters related to address autoconfigu-
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ration. Routers send router advertisement messages that indicate whether the sender 
is willing to be a default router. Router advertisement messages also contain prefix 
information options that list the set of prefixes to configure routable IP addresses. To 
use IP in IEEE 802.15.4 networks, the PAN coordinator acts as the default router and 
may periodically send router advertisement messages in LoWPAN encapsulated mesh 
frames. These messages are delivered to the network using mesh routing algorithm. 
2.3.3 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration 
IPv6 uses NDP and Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SAA) [35] to configure 
IPv6 addresses automatically. IPv6 nodes learn about IPv6 routers and prefixes by 
exchanging router solicitation and router advertisement multicast messages. In [27], 
authors proposed to use unicast router solicitation message to obtain the IPv6 address 
of the access router and the prefix instead of periodic multicast. A node generates the 
Interface Identifier (IID) from the MAC address and append to the prefix obtained 
from the access router to configure its routable IPv6 address. The IPv6 link-local 
address for an IEEE 802.15.4 interface is formed by appending the IID to the prefix 
FE80::/64 as shown in Fig. 2.4. 
If a node uses the IEEE 64-bit extended MAC address (EUI-64), the IID is derived 
from the EUI-64 according to the IPv6 over Ethernet specification [36]. If a 16-bit 
short MAC address is used, a pseudo 48-bit address is derived first by appending 16 
zero bits to the 16-bit PAN ID and then the 16-bit short address, i.e. 48-bit pseudo 
address = 16-bit PAN ID + 16 zero bits + 16-bit short address. The IID is then 
derived from this 48-bit pseudo address as per the IPv6 over Ethernet specification. 
| Router's Prefix | Interface Identifier | 
(a) Routable IPv6 Address 
| FE80: :/64 | Interface Identifier | 
{b} Link-Local IPv6 Address 
Figure 2.4: IPv6 Addresses Autoconfiguration 
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Duplicate Address Detect ion 
A node verifies the uniqueness of a newly generated IPv6 address in the network 
using Duplicate Address Detection (DAD). A node sends a Neighbor Solicitation (NS) 
message via solicited node multicast and a node that detects an address conflict replies 
with a Neighbor Advertisement (NA) message. However, DAD could be optimized for 
IEEE 802.15.4 networks by using proxy DAD. In proxy DAD, when a node configures 
its IPv6 address using SAA, it unicasts an NS message to the PAN coordinator, 
allowing the PAN coordinator to keep track with IP to MAC address bindings of all 
sensor nodes of the WPAN. Upon receipt of an NS message, the PAN coordinator 
searches its DAD cache for a duplicate address. If the soliciting address is found 
duplicate, the PAN coordinator unicasts an NA message to the soliciting node on 
behalf of the node that owns the address. 
Address Resolution 
Address resolution is the process through which a node determines the link-layer 
address of a neighbor given only its IP address. Address resolution is performed only 
on addresses that are determined to be on-link and for which the sender does not 
know the corresponding link-layer address. When a node has a unicast packet to 
send to a neighbor, but does not know the neighbor's link-layer address, it performs 
address resolution by transmitting an NS message to the solicited-node multicast 
address corresponding to the target address. Upon receipt of an NS message, the 
node corresponding to the IP address sends an NA message with its link-layer address 
[32]. The address resolution procedure for mapping IPv6 unicast addresses into IEEE 
802.15.4 link-layer addresses in LoWPAN with mesh routing can use the same process. 
IPv6 multicast addresses can be mapped to 16-bit addresses to be used in IEEE 
802.15.4 networks as shown in Fig. 2.5. The initial 3 bits of the first byte are set to 
100 according the 16-bit address format for multicast addresses as defined in [25]. The 
next 5 bits of the first byte come from the last five bits of 15th octet (DST[14]) and 
the second byte is set to the 16th octet (DST[15]) of the IPv6 address (DST[0..15]). 
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For sensor networks, IPv6 address resolution can be optimized by limiting packet 
exchange between the requesting node and the PAN coordinator to link-layer unicast. 
1 0 . 0 DSH[14]* DST.[15] 
Figure 2.5: IPv6 Multicast Address Mapping 
Neighbor Unreachability Detection 
Communication to or through a neighbor may fail for numerous reasons at any time, 
including hardware failure, node movements, etc. Neighbor Unreachability Detection 
(NUD) is used for all paths between hosts and neighboring nodes, including host-
to-host, host-to-router, and router-to-host communication [32]. NUD is performed 
only for neighbors to which unicast packets are sent and not for multicast addresses. 
When a path to a neighbor appears to be failing, the specific recovery procedure 
depends on how the neighbor is being used, for example, if the neighbor is the ultimate 
destination, address resolution should be performed again. The same NUD procedure 
can be used in IEEE 802.15.4 networks with mesh routing. 
2.4 IP Security Protocol Support 
IP Security protocol (IPSec) [33] provides per-packet authenticity and confidentiality 
guarantees between communicating peers and is mandatory for IPv6 implementation. 
However, power constraints and limited processing capability of sensor devices make 
IPSec be computation intensive and the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) [34] be com-
munication intensive. Since IEEE 802.15.4 devices already have security support at 
the link layer for confidentiality, integrity and replay protection, we need to define 
efficient authentication and key management protocols for sensor devices. 
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2.4.1 Securing Neighbor Discovery 
Securing Neighbor Discovery Protocol (SEND) [37] has been designed to mitigate 
potential threats against the IPv6 neighbor discovery protocol. SEND protocol is 
based uniquely on the Cryptographically Generated Address (CGA) [38], which relies 
heavily on heavyweight RSA signatures and is not suitable for low-power wireless 
sensor networks. Another way of authenticating neighbor discovery messages is to 
use the one-way hash chain without using RSA signatures except for the first router 
solicitation message which uses CGA as proposed in [39]. However, the broadcast 
authentication using one-way hash chain is vulnerable to denial of service attacks 
[40]. In broadcast authentication using one-way hash chain, the broadcasting node 
first sends a packet with message integrity code using a key from the hash key chain 
and it sends the authentication key in some later packet. The receiving node has to 
store all the packets until it receives the packet containing the key in order to verify 
the authenticity of the previously received packet. A malicious node can send forged 
or fabricated broadcast packets and exhaust the receiver's buffer. 
As discussed in Sec. 2.3, it is possible to optimize IPv6 neighbor discovery pro-
cess for wireless sensor networks by using unicasts instead of multicasts. A node that 
needs neighbor information (e.g. router address, IPv6 prefix, duplicate address detec-
tion, etc.) can send router solicitation or neighbor solicitation message to the PAN 
coordinator which is the default access router. The PAN coordinator can then unicast 
router advertisement or proxy neighbor advertisement message to the soliciting node. 
These unicast messages can be protected using the shared secret key between the 
PAN coordinator and the soliciting node. We will explore the security issues in detail 
in Chapter 4 and present a security architecture for sensor networks in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 3 
Mesh Routing and Reliable 
Transport 
Wireless sensor networks are expected to be deployed in mesh topology (see Fig. 3.1) 
for a wide variety of low-cost control and monitoring applications. In order to deliver 
IP packets inside the mesh of sensor devices multi-hop routing protocols are required. 
Furthermore packets may be lost or corrupted due to link failure or transmission 
errors. Therefore, it is also important to use some sort of reliable transport to ensure 
proper IPv6 operations. In following sections, we present efficient routing mechanism 
and reliable data transport for wireless sensor networks based on the IEEE 802.15.4 
standard. 
PAN-C 
O ^D Q 
Figure 3.1: IEEE 802.15.4 Mesh PAN Architecture 
Chapter 3. Mesh Routing and Reliable Transport 26 
3.1 Mesh Routing 
Mesh routing protocols must take into account the resource constraints of sensor 
devices, as well as network topology changes due to a number of reasons such as 
uncertain radio connectivity or battery drain [26] [41]. Several unicast routing pro-
tocols have been proposed for resource-constrained sensor environments [42] [43] [44] 
[45] [46], most them are variants of the Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector routing 
(AODV) [47]. The IETF 6L0WPAN working group has been working on how to apply 
MANET routing protocols into LoWPANs [41]. 
In addition to unicast routing, many emerging sensor network applications involve 
mobile nodes with communication patterns requiring one-to-many and many-to-one 
routing topologies and hence require multicast routing. Multicasting is also required 
to support IPv6 operations in WPAN, for example, the all-node or solicited-node 
multicast is used to transmit NDP messages to on-link neighbors [32]. A number of 
ad hoc multicast routing protocols have also been proposed for MANETs [48] [49] 
[50] [51]. 
Most of the unicast and multicast routing protocols use network flooding for route 
discovery. Furthermore the all-node multicast of the IPv6 neighbor discovery proto-
col is to be realized with link-layer broadcasts because IEEE 802.15.4 devices do not 
provide link-layer multicast. An efficient flooding protocol underneath the IPv6 layer 
is also necessary to provide a virtual single-link broadcast WPAN similar to that of 
the Ethernet spanning tree bridges for proper IPv6 operations. Minimum connected 
dominating set (MCDS) routing [52] based on multipoint relays (MPR) can offer effi-
cient way of flooding in IEEE 802.15.4 based sensor networks by reducing the number 
of redundant retransmissions while diffusing a broadcast message in the network. 
3.1.1 Proposed Mesh Routing Protocol 
In classical flooding (CF), a broadcast packet is forwarded by every node in the net-
work exactly once. In wireless networks, CF uses many redundant retransmissions 
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which may cause the broadcast storm problem [53]. It is possible to select a small sub-
set of nodes called minimum connected dominating set (MCDS) to forward broadcast 
packets to all nodes in wireless networks [52] (see Fig. 3.2). It has been shown that 
the task of finding MCDS nodes is NP-hard [54]. Many heuristic solutions have been 
proposed for the MCDS problem in recent years for wireless ad hoc networks [54] 
[55] [56] [57] [58]. Some of them solve the MCDS problem with polynomial complexi-
ties, while others use link-state information of 2-hop neighbors for selecting broadcast 
forwarders and are not suitable for resource-poor wireless sensor networks. 
Figure 3.2: The MCDS Tree for the Network of Fig. 3.1 
The Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR) [58] protocol optimizes the overhead 
from flooding of control traffic by using only selected nodes called multipoint relays 
(MPRs). Each node selects its MPR set from among its 1-hop symmetric neighbors 
so that all 2-hop neighbors are reachable through the selected MPRs. Zigbee [59] uses 
a tree-based data broadcast technique for IEEE 802.15.4 networks, which minimizes 
the number of forwarders called routers required for flooding [60]. Zigbee routers 
employ self-pruning and forward node selection algorithms based on the hierarchical 
addressing of the logical spanning tree that is formed during association in which a 
node can determine the addresses of tree neighbors from its own address and prunes 
forwarders which are within the radio range. 
Ruiz et al. [55] present a distributed approximation algorithm to the MCDS 
problem, which produces a minimal cost multicast tree for multi-hop wireless mesh 
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networks. Receivers of a multicast group initiate the multicast tree formation by 
broadcasting a request only to their first-hop neighbors indicating the multicast group 
to join. Each of the neighbors acknowledges by sending the number of receivers which 
it covers, by counting the number of requests received. Each of the receivers then 
selects the node that has the highest number of receivers as its root or forwarder. 
Those nodes which are selected as forwarders repeat the process acting as receivers. 
This process yields a number of cost-efficient subtrees which might be isolated from 
one another. The multicast tree (i.e. Steiner tree) among the roots of the subtrees is 
built afterwards. 
In this section, we present the design and evaluation of an optimized broadcast tree 
construction algorithm for efficient flooding inside low-power wireless networks. The 
proposed algorithm is adapted from [55], where every node selects its forwarder from a 
number of candidate nodes which has maximum degree of neighbors and thus produces 
an approximate MCDS tree. The novel features of the proposed algorithm are the 
broadcast tree construction without using periodic HELLO messages or routing table 
exchanges, 2-hop neighbors information, or any other unicast protocol; the broadcast 
tree maintenance uses the link-layer feedbacks in mobile environments. 
Optimized Broadcast Tree Construction 
The optimized broadcast tree construction uses CF for selecting forwarding nodes dy-
namically based on their degree of neighbors. The PAN coordinator (PANC) starts 
the process by flooding a broadcast tree discovery request (BCAST DISCOVERY) 
message to its neighbors to join the broadcast tree (see Fig. 3.3). A BCAST DISCOV-
ERY message is transported in mesh frames and contains PANC's link-layer address 
as the Originator Address, the broadcast address as the Final Destination Address, 
Hops Left for computing distance from the PANC, Sequence Number for duplicate 
packet detection. In addition to above mesh header fields, a BCAST DISCOVERY 
message also contains the number of neighboring nodes associated to this node called 
degree of neighbors, and the link-layer address of the forwarder toward the PANC 
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called parent address. The PANC puts its own address in the Originator Address and 
the parent address fields and a predefined value of maximum number of hops in the 
Hops Left field. 
A node that receives BCAST DISCOVERY messages, first looks up into its mem-
bership table if it already joined the tree. If it has not joined the tree before, then 
it sets the sender that has the maximum degree of neighbors as its forwarder and 
unicasts a broadcast tree join (BCAST JOIN) message to the selected forwarder. A 
BCAST JOIN message contains the broadcast address field in addition to mesh header 
fields. If the receiver is already a member of the broadcast tree, then it changes its 
forwarder only if the sender's degree of neighbor is higher than that of its current 
forwarder and if selecting this node as the forwarder does not create a local loop. In 
order to change the current forwarder, the receiver sends a BCAST JOIN message to 
the newly selected forwarder. The old forwarder removes a child node from its de-
pendents list that joins a new forwarder. A BCAST JOIN message is acknowledged 
with a BCAST JOINACK message containing the broadcast address and a role fields 
in addition to mesh header fields. The value of the role field can be either forwarder 
or leaf. 
Figure 3.3: Broadcast Tree Construction Figure 3.4: Broadcast Tree Construction 
(Hop 1) (Hop 2) 
When the PAN coordinator receives a BCAST JOIN message from one of its neigh-
bors, it increments the children counter by one and changes the role to forwarder for 
the broadcast tree of membership table and then sends a BCAST JOINACK message 
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to the dependent as an acknowledgment. When a broadcast forwarder overhears a 
BCAST JOIN message from one of its dependents that is joining another forwarder, 
it decrements children counter by one and removes that node from its membership 
table. If a forwarder does not have anymore child after removing a dependent from 
the membership table, it resets its role to leaf. 
Each of the newly joined nodes then rebroadcasts the BCAST DISCOVERY mes-
sage to its neighbors after decrementing the Hops Left by one and replacing the degree 
of neighbors with its own. Each node uses an exponential backoff timer for broadcast-
ing BCAST DISCOVERY message in order to avoid the broadcast storm problem and 
waits for a pre-determined amount of time for BCAST JOIN message. A node with 
higher degree of neighbors has more chance to broadcast the BCAST DISCOVERY 
message first, this minimizes the need to change forwarders later. This method of 
hop-by-hop propagation of BCAST DISCOVERY message leads to the creation of 
a connected logical broadcast tree to be shared by all nodes in the network. Since 
every node chooses the node that advertises the maximum degree of neighbors as its 
forwarder, this approach yields a good approximation to the corresponding MCDS 
tree. 
An Illustration: Here we give an illustrative example to explain the optimized 
broadcast tree construction algorithm. The PANC starts the process of optimized 
broadcast tree formation by broadcasting BCAST DISCOVERY message to its neigh-
bors, nodes 2, 3 and 4, as shown in Fig. 3.3 using outbound solid arrows. The neigh-
bors select the PANC as their forwarder and send BCAST JOIN message indicated 
by inbound dotted arrows. In the second round, the nodes 2, 3 and 4 broadcast 
BCAST DISCOVERY messages to their neighbors and nodes 5, 6, 7 and 8 choose 
their forwarders from advertisements with maximum degree of neighbors and mini-
mum distance from the PANC and join the tree as shown in Fig. 3.4. When a node 
receives two or more advertisements with the same degree of neighbors and distance 
from the PANC, it selects the node with minimum node ID as its forwarder (e.g. 
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node 8 chooses node 3 instead of 4). In the third round, nodes 5, 6, 7 and 8 broadcast 
BCAST DISCOVERY messages to their neighbors and nodes 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 
join the tree as shown in Fig. 3.5. In the fourth round, nodes 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 
advertise BCAST DISCOVERY messages to their neighbors but no more nodes to 
join the tree and the process terminates. The final optimized broadcast tree is shown 
in Fig. 3.6 which is an approximation to the MCDS tree shown in Fig. 3.2. 
Figure 3.5: Broadcast Tree Construction 
(Hop 3) Figure 3.6: The Optimized Broadcast Tree 
Broadcast Tree Maintenance: In mobile environments, a forwarding node of 
the broadcast tree can either die or move away from its dependents. In such cases, 
the broadcast tree could be partitioned or leaf nodes could be isolated from the tree 
in spite of having connected physical network. To keep the broadcast tree up to 
date, we devise a reactive tree maintenance process. From link-layer feedback, when 
a forwarder sees that a leaf node dies or moves away, it removes that child from its 
dependent list and decrements its children counter by one and if it reaches zero, then 
the forwarder changes its role to leaf. 
When a leaf node notices that its forwarder dies or goes away, it initiates a local 
recovery by broadcasting a BCAST SOLICITATION message to its neighbors. A 
BCAST SOLICITATION message contains only mesh header fields. If a node that 
receives the BCAST SOLICITATION message has a valid forwarder, it replies with 
a BCAST DISCOVERY message to the sender. Otherwise the receiver decrements 
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the Hops Left by one and if Hops Left reaches zero, it drops the packet otherwise 
it rebroadcasts the BCAST SOLICITATION message to its neighbors. When the 
soliciting node receives a BCAST DISCOVERY message, it selects its forwarder and 
sends a BCAST JOIN message to the sender of BCAST DISCOVERY message. The 
BCAST JOIN message is then processed by the receiver as discussed in Sec. 3.1.1. 
When a new node joins the network and does not receive a BCAST DISCOVERY 
message within a specified time, it broadcasts a BCAST SOLICITATION message 
to its neighbors. The neighbors replies with BCAST DISCOVERY message and the 
new node selects its forwarder based on the sender's degree of neighbors and sends 
a BCAST JOIN message to the selected forwarder. The selected forwarder then 
changes its role to forwarder (if needed), increments children counter by one and 
sends a BCAST JOINACK message to the newly joined node. 
Optimized Multicast Routing 
The On Demand Multicast Routing Protocol (ODMRP) [48] operates by periodically 
flooding a control packet to recreate the multicast forwarding tree. When a source 
has data to send to a multicast group, the source floods a query control packet which 
is forwarded by every node in the network. Each node sets the reverse path, so that 
it can forward query reply messages from the receivers of the group to the source. 
Each node that forwards a query reply message sets its group forwarding flag for the 
group indicated in the header of the packet. When a node receives a packet for a 
multicast group for which it has a set forwarding flag, the node broadcasts the packet 
if it is not a duplicate. The Adaptive Demand-Driven Multicast Routing (ADMR) 
[49], similar to ODMRP, dynamically establishes and maintains multicast forwarding 
states only for active groups and only in nodes located between multicast senders 
and receivers. The TinyADMR [61] is an optimized version of the ADMR protocol 
for wireless sensor networks. TinyADMR uses Path Delivery Ratio (PDR) as the 
routing metric, which is computed from the Link Quality Indicator (LQI) and the 
Link Delivery Ratio (LDR) other than hop count. 
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Figure 3.7: Optimized Multicast Tree Formation 
In this section, we present an optimized multicast routing protocol based on [61], 
which uses the optimized broadcast tree for flooding route discovery message instead of 
CF. When a source has data to send to a multicast group, it floods a multicast route 
discovery (MCAST DISCOVERY) message using the broadcast tree. The MCAST 
DISCOVERY message containing group address is delivered to all nodes in the net-
work by the broadcast tree forwarders. Broadcast tree forwarders set reverse path 
for this sender and this group address before forwarding the MCAST DISCOVERY 
message. Upon receipt of MCAST DISCOVERY message, each of the group mem-
bers sends MCAST JOIN message back to the sender using the reverse path. The 
broadcast tree forwarders on the path of MCAST JOIN message, set themselves as 
forwarders for this group address and hence the multicast tree is established. The 
other broadcast forwarders, which set reverse path but has not received MCAST 
JOIN message, remove the entry after a predefined amount of time. Once a sender 
receives a MCAST JOIN message, it can send data packets for this group over the 
multicast tree. Fig. 3.7 illustrates the process of creating a multicast tree on top 
of the broadcast tree, where double circles indicate forwarders, S stands for source 
node, and M represents group membership. 
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Data Structures: In order to support the functions described in Sec. 3.1.1, each 
node maintains two tables: membership table and request table. The membership 
table keeps records whether a node is a receiver or forwarder for a given group. The 
request table is used for duplicate packet detection. 
• Membership table: This table stores one entry for each multicast group address 
for which this node is either a receiver member of a forwarder. Note that broad-
cast address is considered as a special multicast group address and forwarders 
for this address form the broadcast tree. Each entry in the membership table 
includes a flag to indicate if this node is a receiver and a flag to indicate if this 
node is a forwarder. This table also stores other parameters of the forwarding 
tree such as source address, parent address, distance from source, if this node is 
a forwarder for a group, then number of dependent nodes and their addresses 
for this forwarder. 
• Request table: This table maintains the history of route discoveries in order to 
avoid forwarding duplicate route discovery messages. It stores requesting node's 
address, group address, and sequence number. When a node receives a route 
discovery message to join a multicast group, it checks its request table for an 
entry for that group. If no entry for the group exists in the table, the node 
records the address of the group, together with the address of the requesting 
node's address and the sequence number. 
Forwarding Application Data: When the PAN coordinator receives an IP packet 
from the Internet to be delivered to a destination inside the PAN, it passes the packet 
to the mesh layer. The mesh layer constructs a mesh delivery frame for the IP packet 
as discussed in chapter 2. If it is a unicast packet, the mesh routing sublayer will 
employ the unicast routing to deliver the IP packet to its destination. 
If it is a multicast packet, the mesh routing sublayer will employ the optimized 
multicast routing protocol to discover the multicast tree. The PAN coordinator then 
broadcasts the frame to its neighbors. A node that receives a mesh frame with a 
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multicast destination address, first checks the Sequence Number for freshness and 
then checks its membership table to determine if it is a forwarder for this group. If 
the receiver is a forwarder for this group, it decrements the Hops Left by one. If Hops 
Left reaches zero, it drops the frame otherwise rebroadcasts the frame. A node will 
forward a packet only once by keeping records of Originator Address and Sequence 
Number pairs of the mesh header. For data packets, each receiving node checks its 
membership table to determine if it is a receiver for this group. If so, it will pass the 
packet up within the protocol stack to allow the packet to be processed as a received 
multicast packet. 
In the reverse direction, when a node has a packet to be sent to the Internet, it 
forwards the packet to the PAN coordinator using mesh routing, the PAN coordinator 
then forwards the packet to the outside world like a conventional router. If an IP 
packet does not fit in a single IEEE 802.15.4 frame, it is broken into link fragments by 
the LoWPAN adaptation layer before passing it to the mesh routing sublayer. On the 
receiving side, the LoWPAN adaptation layer performs the reassembly of IP packet 
fragments as discussed in chapter 2. 
3.1.2 Simulation Results 
In order to evaluate the performance of the optimized broadcast tree construction 
algorithm with the Zigbee forward node selection algorithm [60], we have simulated 
the protocol using NS-2 simulator [62] with the IEEE 802.15.4 MAC protocol in 
peer-to-peer mode. We have simulated the broadcast tree construction for networks 
of 15, 20, 30, 40 and 50 nodes with randomly generated topologies using the CMU's 
cmu-scen-gen utility. The area of the sensor field has been chosen based on the 
number of nodes so that the network has been connected. We have chosen 8, 9, 12, 
17 and 23 group members randomly from the networks of 15, 20, 30, 40 and 50 nodes 
respectively for simulating the multicast tree construction algorithm. 
Chapter 3. Mesh Routing and Reliable Transport 36 
Sizes of Broadcast and Multicast Trees 
The number of nodes and the depth of the broadcast or multicast tree depends on the 
density and distributions of nodes in a network. However, the shortest path tree does 
not ensure the minimum connected dominating set forwarding tree. Fig. 3.8 shows 
the average numbers of forwarding nodes for the broadcast trees for different sized 
networks for our algorithm and the ZigBee forward node selection algorithm. Fig. 
3.9 shows the average number of forwarding nodes for the multicast trees for specific 
group sizes for different sized networks. Note that the group source can be any node 
and may not be a broadcast forwarder. Thus the number of multicast forwarders 
including the group source sometimes is higher than the number of broadcast tree 
forwarders for smaller networks. 
Number of Nodes 
Figure 3.8: Sizes of Broadcast Trees 
Complexity of Broadcast Tree Construction 
Simulation results show that the number of messages need to be exchanged and 
the time it takes to converge the broadcast tree by the broadcast tree construction 
algorithm are linearly proportional to the number of nodes in the network. Fig. 3.10 
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Figure 3.9: Sizes of Multicast Trees 
shows the average number of messages exchanged in order to elect broadcast tree 
forwarders for different sized networks by the optimized broadcast tree construction 
algorithm and the ZigBee forward node selection algorithm. Note that the number of 
retransmissions needed for lost control messages are also taken into account, otherwise 
the number of messages would be much less. 
The average time it takes to construct the broadcast tree during simulation is 
shown in Fig. 3.11. From the simulation results, it is shown that the time it takes to 
converge the broadcast tree is linear to the number of nodes in the network. 
Redundant Retransmissions 
The broadcast tree is shared by all the nodes in the network and can be used to flood 
higher layer data to the network. Broadcast packets get delivered with minimum 
number of retransmissions by intermediate nodes because only the forwarders relay 
packets sent by a source node. Fig. 3.12 presents simulation results to compare the 
average redundant retransmissions for delivering broadcast packets by the optimized 
broadcast tree and the ZigBee forward node selection algorithm. 
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Figure 3.10: Communication Complexity of Broadcast Tree Construction 
3.2 Reliable Data Transport 
Many sensor network applications including medical monitoring, require reliable de-
livery of sensor readings. However, TCP, the widely used reliable transport protocol 
in the Internet, is not suitable for wireless sensor networks due to resource limita-
tions. A large number of reliable transport protocols have been proposed for wireless 
sensor networks so far [63] [64] [65] [66] [67]. Some of them are used to deliver sen-
sor readings or event data reliably in the sensors-to-sink direction, while others are 
used to disseminate reprogramming code or control information in the sink-to-sensors 
direction. 
3.2.1 Proposed Reliable Transport Protocol 
In this section, we present a reliable data transport (RDT) protocol for muti-hop 
wireless sensor networks based on hop-by-hop error recovery and congestion control 
mechanisms [14]. We have considered the scarcity of bandwidth and battery power of 
sensor nodes and the requirement of real-time delivery of sensor readings to the sink 
in designing the reliable transport protocol for wireless sensor networks. With above 
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Figure 3.11: Time Complexity of Broadcast Tree Construction 
constraints in mind, our objectives are to minimize the number of retransmissions 
due to packet loss and to detect packet loss as early as possible. 
Hop-by-Hop Error Recovery 
The Internet's reliable transport protocols (e.g. TCP) commonly use end-to-end error 
detection and recovery process. The number of retransmissions required to deliver a 
packet successfully in a multi-hop network depends on the link error rates on the path. 
For low error rate links, an end-to-end approach shows better performance than that 
of a hop-by-hop approach. In an end-to-end scheme, the number of retransmissions 
required to deliver data successfully in multi-hop networks increases exponentially 
to the number of hops [63]. For example, if the error rate of a wireless channel 
is p, then the probability of delivering a packet successfully across a single hop is 
1 — p. Therefore, the probability of delivering a packet successfully across n hops is 
(1 — p)n. Moreover, if a packet is lost or corrupted at (n— l)th hop and the destination 
node requests a retransmission, then it requires n — 2 unnecessary retransmissions by 
nodes from the source to the (n — 2)th node and the probability of getting lost this 
retransmission before reaching (n— l)th node is pn~2. For larger networks, it is almost 
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Figure 3.12: Redundant Retransmissions 
impossible to deliver a message successfully using end-to-end mechanism in a lossy 
environment such as wireless sensors networks. On the other hand, in a hop-by-hop 
scheme, the number of retransmissions required to deliver data packets successfully 
in multi-hop networks increases linearly to the number of hops. 
Therefore, to minimize the number of retransmissions and hence to save battery 
power, the reliable data transport protocol should use hop-by-hop error recovery 
procedure in which every node on the path detects packet error and performs error 
recovery by asking retransmission to its preceding node. 
Selective Repeat (SR) protocol used in the Internet uses a fixed sized window and 
requests retransmissions selectively. The proposed reliable data transport protocol 
uses an ACK-based SR protocol, where every node uses a small sized buffer of length 
four. Packets in the buffer wait for an ACK from its successor node or recently 
received from the predecessor node. Packets in the window do not need to be received 
sequentially. The receiving node sends selective ACK when a corrupted packet or an 
out of order packet is received. The control packet includes the sequence base, i.e. the 
largest sequence number without any missing packets, and the sequence numbers of 
lost or corrupted packets. By using selective ACK mechanism, the number of control 
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packets is minimized and the protocol works very much like negative ACK requests 
for lost or corrupted packets. For data integrity check, the cyclic redundancy code 
(CRC) is used like TCP. 
The reliable transport protocol establishes a two-way connection between the 
source and the destination before transmitting application data. The source node 
sends a RDTSYN message containing a number of connection parameters such as 
connection identifier, buffer size, data size, start sequence number to the destination. 
Each node on the path sets up the connection by initializing connection parameters. 
The destination upon receiving RDTSYN replies with RDTSYNACK to notify the 
source that the connection has been established successfully. At the end of appli-
cation data transmission, the source node sends RDTFIN to signal nodes along the 
path to close the connection. Each node on the path starts connection timeout timer 
after receiving RDTFIN message and forwards it. The destination after receiving 
RDTFIN releases all resources and sends a RDTFINACK to the source. The in-
termediate nodes forward RDTFINACK and release all resources. If RDTFINACK 
is lost, intermediate nodes releases connection when the connection timeouts. Ap-
pendix B and Appendix C present simplified state machines for the RDT sender and 
the RDT receiver respectively. 
Congestion Control 
The reliable data transport protocol uses BUFFER FULL and BUFFER EMPTY 
control messages for congestion control. Intermediate nodes on the path use small 
sized buffers of length four. When the receive buffer of an intermediate node becomes 
full, the receiving node sends a BUFFER FULL message to its preceding node, so 
that the preceding node stops sending further packets. When the node has buffer 
space enough to receive further packets, it sends a BUFFER EMPTY message to 
its preceding node. In wireless sensor networks, control messages can be lost due 
to transmission errors. To avoid the problems of missing control message, control 
messages are acknowledged with ACK. If an acknowledgement for a control message 
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Figure 3.13: RDT Congestion Control 
is not received within predetermined time, the sender retransmits the control message. 
If packet loss occurs due to congestion, the receiving node sends an ACK message 
to its preceding node to indicate congestion. After receiving an ACK packet, the 
preceding node retransmits missing packets that are lost due to congestion. Fig. 
3.13 illustrates the selective repeat process for error recovery and hence reliable data 
transport. 
Chapter 4 
Sensor Network Security 
The deployment of wireless sensor networks is becoming more and more common in 
a wide variety of applications for collecting and disseminating important and sensi-
tive information. As the application of wireless sensor networks increasing, security 
becomes an important concern since any vulnerability in the system will limit its 
practical use. However, designing security protocols for resource-poor sensor devices 
is a difficult problem [68] [69]. A number of security protocols have been proposed 
for sensor networks in recent years [68] [69] [70] [71] [72] [59]. Boyle and Newe [40] 
present a detailed survey of security protocols proposed for wireless sensor networks. 
4.1 Security Threats 
Wireless sensor networks are vulnerable to a large number of security attacks be-
cause of their wireless broadcast communication media and resource constraints. In 
a broadcast medium, adversaries can easily eavesdrop on, intercept, inject, and alter 
transmitted data. Due to limited resources, (e.g. battery, bandwidth, processing 
power, etc.) an adversary can easily launch resource exhaustion attacks on sensor 
networks. Furthermore, since sensor networks are deployed in a variety of physically 
insecure environments, adversary can steal nodes, recover their cryptographic mate-
rial, modify programs in sensor nodes, and pose as authorized nodes in the network. 
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Several types of denial of service (DoS) attacks can be launched against wireless 
sensor networks; at the PHY layer, the DoS attacks could be tempering and jamming 
electromagnetic signals. At the link layer, it could be collision and contention of 
deliberate stray frames. At the network layer, it could be an outburst of packets in 
the name of network traffic during homing. At the transport layer, attacks could 
be realized by keeping half-open and half-close TCP connections in sensor networks 
connected to the Internet. 
In wireless sensor networks, it is very common to perform a task by a num-
ber of nodes together, there is a burgeoning need to distribute subtasks and ensure 
redundancy of information. In such malicious node can launch a Sybil at-
tack by spoofing other nodes identities [73]. Sybil attacks can be performed against 
the distributed storage, routing mechanism, data aggregation, voting, fair resource-
allocation and misbehavior detection, etc. 
A malicious node can launch a black hole attack [74] to attract all the traffic in 
the sensor network. In this attack, an attacker listens to route requests and then 
replies to the requesting nodes that it has the high-quality or shortest path to the 
destination. Once a malicious node is able to insert itself between the communicating 
nodes, it is able to do anything with packets passing through it. Similar to black hole 
attack, is a wormhole attack [75], where an attacker records packets at one location 
in the network and tunnels those to another location. 
4.2 Security Requirements 
In this section, we formalize the security properties required by sensor networks, and 
show how they are directly applicable in typical sensor network applications. 
4.2.1 Data Confidentiality 
Data confidentiality is the process of keeping sensitive information secret from unau-
thorized parties. The main goal of data confidentiality is to ensure that sensitive 
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information is not disclosed to any one other than the intended receivers. The stan-
dard way of achieving data confidentiality is to employ encryption with a secret key 
that is known only by the intended receivers. An encryption scheme should not only 
protect data from unauthorized parties, but also prevent adversaries from retrieving 
any information about the messages that have been encrypted. This strong property 
is known as semantic security [76]. 
4.2.2 Data Integrity 
Data integrity protection is the process by which a node can verify that the received 
message is not altered in-transit by an adversary. However, due to malicious attacks 
or benign failures such as transmission collisions and radio propagation impairment, 
a message may be corrupted in-transit. Data integrity guarantees that a message 
is delivered as it is, without replacement, deletion, injection, resorting, or any other 
modifications. Data integrity is usually achieved by using symmetric-key message 
integrity code in a two-party communication. 
4.2.3 Source Authentication 
Source authentication is the process by which a node can verify the identity of the orig-
inating node of a message. It is very important in many sensor network functionalities 
such as beaconing, association, PAN ID conflict resolution, network reprogramming, 
etc. In wireless networks, an adversary can easily inject messages, so the receiver 
needs to make sure that the received message is from the claimed source and not 
from an adversary. In a two-party communication, source authentication is usually 
performed by using symmetric-key message integrity code with a shared secret key. 
4.2.4 Replay Protection 
Information flowing in sensor networks is often time-sensitive. A malicious node that 
eavesdrops on a legitimate communication between two authorized nodes can store 
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valid messages and can replay them at some later time. Therefore, it is not enough to 
only guarantee confidentiality and authentication; it is also important to ensure that 
each message is fresh and valid in the context of the applications. Replay protection 
can be achieved with either a monotonically increasing sequence number, or a random 
nonce or a timestamp on each message. 
4.2.5 Access control 
Access control means the link layer protocol should prevent unauthorized parties 
from participating in the network. Since a sensor device is designed for a specific 
application and is not shared by different applications or users, device authentication 
is sufficient for access control and user authentication is not required. Legitimate 
nodes should be able to detect messages from unauthorized nodes and discard them. 
4.2.6 Availability 
The goal of availability is to ensure the survivability of network services despite DoS 
attacks or any other failures (e.g. link or node failure). Since sensor network devices 
are highly resource-constrained, they can easily suffer from attacks based on resource 
consumption. Availability of sensor networks is commonly ensured using redundant 
nodes in case of DoS attacks or node failures. 
4.3 Security Building Blocks 
4.3.1 Da ta Encryption 
Data confidentiality is achieved by means of encryption, which is the process of trans-
forming information by using some security parameters called keys, to make it unread-
able to anyone except those possessing the secret key. There are two different encryp-
tion technologies: symmetric-key and public-key. Public-key encryption techniques 
are flexible for many applications; however, they are expensive in terms of computa-
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tion, processing time, and key sizes and therefore are not suitable for resource-poor 
sensor devices. On the other hand, symmetric-key encryption techniques use simple 
computation and small sized keys and therefore suitable for securing sensor networks. 
There is a large number of symmetric-key encryption algorithms available and they 
are classified into two categories: block ciphers and stream ciphers. 
A stream cipher uses a secret key and an Initialization Vector (IV) as the seed 
and generates a large pseudo-random keystream from them. The keystream is then 
XORed with the message to obtain ciphertext, the IV is also sent with the cipher-
text. Stream ciphers are lightweight and very fast and suitable for real-time and 
resource-poor devices. However, stream ciphers require unique IV value for each 
block, otherwise it is often possible to recover both plaintexts, when the same IV 
is used to encrypt two different messages [69]. In order to ensure IV uniqueness, it 
must be long enough (e.g. 8 or 16 octets), however this increases the message length 
significantly and is not acceptable in wireless sensor networks. 
A block cipher is a symmetric-key cipher, which performs a keyed pseudo-random 
permutation on fixed-length groups of bits, called blocks. There is a large num-
ber of block cipher algorithms, such as the Data Encryption Standard (DES), triple 
DES, Data Encryption Algorithm with Larger blocks (DEAL), the Advanced Encryp-
tion Standards (AES), RC family, International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA), 
Blowfish, Skipjack, etc. Since messages to be encrypted usually longer than the block 
size, block ciphers break the message into a number of pieces of that size. If the length 
of the last block is smaller than the block size, padding zeros are appended to the 
block. Block ciphers can be used in different modes: electronic codebook (ECB), ci-
pher block chaining (CBC), cipher feedback (CFB), output feedback (OFB), counter 
(CTR), CBC in counter mode (CCM), EAX mode, Galois/Counter Mode (GCM), 
etc. The CBC is the most common mode of operation for block ciphers, in which the 
current block is XORed with the preceding ciphertext block using the same key for all 
blocks. A block cipher can also be used as a message integrity protection algorithm 
like AES-CCM. 
Chapter 4. Sensor Network Security 48 
4.3.2 Message Integrity Code 
A common solution to message authenticity and integrity protection is to use a Mes-
sage Integrity Code (MIC), also known as message authentication code. A MIC can 
be viewed as a cryptographically secure checksum of a message. Computing a MIC 
requires the sender and the receiver to share a secret key, and this key is a part of the 
input to the MIC computation. The sender computes a MIC over the message with 
the shared secret key and appends it to the message. The receiver sharing the same 
secret key recomputes the MIC on the received message and compares resulting MIC 
with the received one. If the received one matches with the computed one, the receiver 
accepts the message as authentic and rejects it otherwise. MIC computation must 
be strong so that an adversary cannot forge a MIC without knowing the secret key. 
There is a number of standard algorithms available for computing message integrity 
code such as Message Digest (MD5), Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) family, Hashed 
Message Authentication Code (HMAC), AES cipher-based message authentication 
code (AES-CMAC), AES-CCM, etc. 
4.4 Authentication and Key Management 
Authentication and key management are two important services required to provide 
the proper operation of a network. Authentication is the process by which a node 
verifies the identity of another node in the network. Key management is the process 
by which cryptographic keys are distributed and shared throughout the network. 
There is a number of authentication and key management methods available, such as 
pre-shared key, trusted third party, and public-key certificate. 
4.4.1 Key Distribution Methods 
The simplest way of key distribution is to load one or more keys onto each sensor 
node prior to deployment. Most practical security protocols based on pre-deployed 
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keying use either a single network-wide key shared by all sensor nodes or a set of keys 
randomly chosen from a key pool so that two nodes will share (at least) one key with 
a certain probability [77]. These protocols are easy to implement and have only little 
overhead since no complex computations or communication need to be performed. 
However, these protocols are not scalable for larger networks and are vulnerable to 
node capture attacks. 
The second way of key distribution is to use a trusted third-party like a Public 
Key Infrastructure (PKI) or a Key Distribution Center (KDC) to establish shared 
keys between sensor nodes. Each node shares a long-term shared secret with the 
trusted-server and nodes relies completely on that server for key derivation. If the 
server is compromised, the trust amongst sensor nodes is gone. These protocols 
use symmetric-key cryptography for key derivation and have high communication 
overhead. 
The Difne-Hellman (DH) key exchange protocol is the commonly used key agree-
ment protocol based on public-key cryptography and widely used in the Internet. The 
DH key exchange protocol is usually implemented using the multiplicative group of 
a finite field of prime numbers of the order of 1024 or 2048 bits [78], which is not 
suitable for resource-poor sensor devices. The recent implementation of the DH key 
exchange using Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) has proven its feasibility for sen-
sor networks [79]. The Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) uses additive group of 
points on an elliptic curve defined over a finite field, but still consumes 67 times more 
energy than that of trusted third-party based key agreement using symmetric-key 
cryptography [80]. 
4.4.2 Authentication Methods 
Challenge-Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP) is the commonly used au-
thentication protocol, which uses a 3-way handshake to authenticate communicating 
parties. The initiator sends a random challenge to the responder in the first mes-
sage. The responder replies with a value calculated from the initiator's random chal-
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lenge and responder's random challenge using a one-way hash function. The initiator 
checks the response against its own calculation of the expected hash value. If the 
values match, the authenticator acknowledges with authentication success; otherwise 
it sends authentication failure to the responder. 
Another way of authentication is to use a third-party authentication server, where 
communicating parties share secret keys with the server. The source sends authen-
tication request to the authentication server for a destination. The authentication 
server generates a temporary authentication key and sends the key to both the source 
and the destination. Upon receipt of the temporary authentication key, the source 
generates a session key and sends it to the destination encrypted with the authenti-
cation key. The destination verifies the authenticity of the key and replies with an 
authentic success message. 
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [81] provides an infrastructure for 
network access clients and authentication servers to host plug-in modules for current 
and future authentication methods and technologies. An EAP infrastructure consists 
of an EAP Peer or Supplicant that is attempting to access the network, an EAP 
Authenticator or Network Access Server (NAS) that is requiring EAP authentica-
tion prior to granting access to the network, and an Authentication Server (AS) that 
negotiates the use of a specific EAP method with an EAP peer, validates the EAP 
peer's credentials, and authorizes access to the network. Typically, the authentica-
tion server is a Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) server [82]. 
The EAP peer and the EAP authenticator exchange EAP messages using link-layer 
transport protocol such as Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) [83] or the IEEE 802. lx 
protocol [84]. The EAP authenticator and the authentication server exchange EAP 
messages using RADIUS. 
Overview of GPSK EAP Authentication 
The Generalized Pre-Shared Key (GPSK) EAP authentication (EAP-GPSK) per-
forms mutual authentication between an EAP Peer and the AS using a Pre-Shared 
Chapter 4. Sensor Network Security 51 
Key (PSK). The GPSK authentication protocol consists of four message exchanges 
{GPSK-1, GPSK-2, GPSK-3, and GPSK-4), in which both parties exchange nonces 
and their identities, compute and exchange MICs over the previously exchanged val-
ues using with the PSK. The MIC is considered as the proof of possession of the 
PSK [85]. A successful EAP-GPSK authentication exchange in pass-through mode is 
shown in Fig. 4.1. 
Supplicant Authenticates 
lAP-Request/Identity 
EAP-Response/Identity 
EAP-Request 
EAP-Response 
EAP-Request 
EAP-Response 
EAP-Success 
Access-Request 
'GPSK-1 
AS 
'GPSK-2 
'GPSK-3 
'GPSK-4 
Access-Accept 
Figure 4.1: GPSK EAP Authentication Exchanges 
The authenticator initiates the process by sending EAP-Request/'Identity to the 
supplicant. In response to EAP-Request/Identity, the supplicant sends EAP-Response 
/Identity containing peer's Network Access ID (NAI) to the authenticator. Upon re-
ceipt of EAP-Response/Identity from a supplicant, the authenticator sends an EAP-
Request/'Access-Request RADIUS access request to the AS for the supplicant. The 
AS initiates the EAP-GPSK authentication process by sending EAP-Request/GPSK-
1 message consisting of the server's identity, a random number, and a list of available 
cipher suites to the supplicant. Upon receipt of EAP-Request/GPSK-1, the suppli-
cant derives all GPSK keys from its own and received parameters using the PSK. 
In response to EAP-Request/GPSK-1, the supplicant sends EAP-Response/GPSK-2 
containing its identity, a random number, received parameters from the server, se-
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lected cipher suite, and a MIC computed over all these parameters. The AS derive 
keys from received and its own parameters using the PSK. The AS compares the 
received MIC with the computed MIC and if succeeds, it computes another MIC over 
the session parameters and returns it to the peer in EAP-Request/GPSK-3 message. 
The supplicant verifies the received MIC and if the verification is successful, it sends 
EAP-Response/GPSK-4 to the AS. Upon receipt of EAP-Response/GPSK-4, the AS 
assures that the supplicant has derived session necessary keys properly. The AS then 
sends an EAP'-Request/Access-Accept RADIUS message to the authenticator to in-
dicate the successful outcome of the authentication and exports the Master Session 
Key (MSK) to the authenticator. 
4.5 WSN Security Protocols 
4.5.1 SPINS 
Perrig et al. [68] proposed a set of security protocols for TinyOS based wireless 
sensor networks (SPINS) including Secure Network Encryption Protocol (SNEP) and 
the micro version of Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication (//TESLA). 
The SNEP provides data confidentiality and message integrity and authentication. 
The /iTESLA provides a mechanism for broadcast authentication using hash chain 
and symmetric key primitives. 
SNEP uses RC5 in counter (CTR) mode for encryption and the same encryption 
algorithm in cipher block chaining mode for message authentication (CBC-MAC). It 
provides semantic security by using a counter, which is incremented after each mes-
sage, to prevent eavesdroppers from inferring the message content from the encrypted 
message. The counter value is sufficiently long enough never to repeat within the life-
time of the node. The monotonically increasing counter provides replay protection 
and weak freshness. It has a very low communication overhead, adding only 8 bytes 
per message. 
//TESLA provides broadcast authentication by using a chain of hash values used as 
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symmetric keys. It relies on delayed disclosure of symmetric keys and requires that 
the base station and other nodes are loosely time synchronized. The base station 
chooses a random value as the seed and generates a chain of key values from that 
seed using some public one-way hash function, F. For an authenticated packet to be 
sent, the base station computes a CBC-MAC on the packet with the key that is secret 
at that point in time (initially the last value of the key chain). When a node gets 
a packet, it can confirm that the base station did not yet disclose the corresponding 
MIC key, using its loosely synchronized clock, maximum synchronization error and 
the time at which the keys are to be disclosed. The node stores the packet in a buffer, 
aware that the MIC key is only known to the base station, and that no adversary 
could have altered the packet during transmission. After a predefined amount of time, 
the base station broadcasts the key to all receivers. The receiver can then verify the 
correctness of the key and use it to authenticate the packet stored in the buffer. 
4.5.2 TinySec 
Karlof et al. [69] designed link layer security architecture for TinyOS [2] based wire-
less sensor networks called TinySec, which borrowed similar concepts of authentica-
tion, encryption, message integrity, and replay protection from the SNEP. TinySec 
provides two different security options: authenticated encryption (TinySec-AE) and 
authentication only (TinySec-Auth). With TinySec-AE, TinySec encrypts the data 
payload and authenticates the packet with a MIC. The MIC is computed over the 
encrypted data and the packet header. In TinySec-Auth, TinySec authenticates the 
entire packet with a MIC, but the data payload is not encrypted. In TinySec-AE, a 
TinyOS packet can carry a payload of up to 29 bytes, with a packet header of 8 bytes 
and a MIC of 4 bytes, whereas in TinySec-Auth, a TinyOS packet can carry up to 29 
bytes of payload, with a packet header of 4 bytes and a MIC of 4 bytes long. 
TinySec uses either Skipjack or RC5 in CBC mode with cipher text stealing for 
encryption with and CBC-MAC for message authentication. TinySec uses specially 
formatted 8-byte IV with CBC encryption. Since the security of CBC mode of en-
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cryption depends on no reuse of IV and using longer IV increase packet overheads. 
Thus, to minimize packet overhead, TinySec generates IV from a 2-byte counter, the 
2-byte source address, 2-byte destination address, 1-byte message type, and 1-byte 
payload length. 
The security of CBC-MAC depends on the length of the MIC and TinySec uses a 
4 byte MIC, which is much less than the conventional size of 8 or 16 bytes. Authors 
argue that 4 byte MIC provides an adequate level of security for sensor networks 
because an adversary needs 231 attempts to forge one packet blindly. In sensor net-
works, it would take approximately 20 months with a 19.2 kbps radio to forge one 
packet blindly. Implicitly, there is an effective denial of service attack launched in 
this way, as the radio channel would be locked for an extended period as attempts are 
made. It is argued that a simple heuristic, whereby the nodes signal the base station 
when the rate of MIC failures exceeds a predetermined threshold would alleviate the 
problem should such an attack occur. 
4.5.3 Sizzle 
Gupta et al. [70] proposed an end-to-end security architecture for sensor networks. 
They have shown that public-key cryptography is feasible for sensor devices and ex-
isting public key protocols can be implemented on sensor devices. They implement 
a small-footprint HTTPS stack, nicknamed Sizzle, on different versions of the Berke-
ley/Crossbow motes. They have showed that Sizzle runs in less than 4KB of RAM, 
performs a full SSL handshake in 1 second (session reuse takes 0.5 seconds) and 
transfers 1KB of application data over SSL in 0.4 seconds. 
Sizzle implements a subset of SSL features to meet tight resource constraints while 
addressing the security needs for a wide array of usage scenarios. Sizzle implements 
the MD5 and SHA1 hashing and RC4 for bulk encryption. It uses ECDH-ECDSA 
for key exchange due to its efficiency and uses RSA only for compatibility with ex-
isting web browsers. The cipher suites enabled in Sizzle do not entail sending the 
ServerKeyExchange message and the servers ECC or RSA public key is sent in a cer-
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tificate and omits optional extensions. It uses 4-byte session identifier values rather 
than the 32-byte values used in Apache and other servers with much larger scalability 
requirements. Besides implementing session reuse, Sizzle also implements persistent 
HTTP(S) to further reduce the overhead of public-key cryptography. It does not send 
out the CertificateRequest message and clients are authenticated using passwords. It 
maintains state for only one SSL connection at a time. Another bandwidth saving 
feature of Sizzle is to use reduced HTTP headers by eliminating optional fields. 
4.5.4 Zigbee Security Architecture 
The Zigbee specification [59] defines security architecture for the IEEE 802.15.4 net-
works, which splits the security functionalities into three layers - medium access 
control (MAC), network (NWK) and application (APS). The main responsibilities 
of the NWK layer include the mechanisms used to join and leave a network, apply 
security to frames and to route frames to their intended destinations. The APS layer 
is responsible for the establishment and maintenance of security relationships. Zigbee 
uses a trust center, usually the Zigbee coordinator, for authentication and key man-
agement. The trust center plays three roles: trust manager, network manager, and 
configuration manager. The trust manager authenticates devices requesting to join 
the network. A network manager distributes and maintains network keys to devices. 
A configuration manager enables end-to-end security between devices by binding two 
applications. Zigbee define two security modes: residential for low-security applica-
tions and commercial for high-security applications. In residential mode, the trust 
center uses pre-shared keys to authenticate devices and does not provide key man-
agement. In commercial mode, the trust center establishes and maintains keys and 
freshness counters with every device in the network, providing centralized control and 
update of keys. 
When a device completes IEEE 802.15.4 association procedure successfully with 
a coordinator, router in Zigbee terminology, the router initiates authentication pro-
cedure by sending Update Device request to the trust center. If the device is not 
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pre-configured with a shared master key, the trust center sends a master key to the 
device in plain text. Otherwise, the trust center and the device use the Symmetric-Key 
Key Exchange (SKKE) protocol, an authentication protocol for mutual authentica-
tion and key agreement. The trust center initiates the SKKE protocol by issuing an 
authenticator's challenge to the device. The device replies with a device's challenge, 
a bit string chosen by the device, the device also includes a message integrity code 
(MIC) computed over the device's ID, the trust center's ID, the device's challenge, the 
trust center's challenge, the random bit string chosen by the device, and a constant 
0x02 using the shared MIC key. The trust center validates the MIC and, if succeeds, 
responds with a random bit string with a MIC computed over the device's ID, the 
trust center's ID, the device's challenge, the trust center's challenge, the random bit 
string selected by the device, the random bit string chosen by the trust center, and 
a constant 0x03 using the shared MIC key. After successful authentication process, 
the trust center sends the network key securely to the device using transport key 
primitive. 
Zigbee uses a triangular handshake procedure for mutual authentication and key 
exchange between any pair of devices in the PAN. The initiator device starts the 
process by sending key request including the responder's address to the trust center. 
Upon receipt of key request, the trust center generates a temporary master key and 
sends the key securely to both the initiator and the responder using Key Transport 
primitive. The initiator and the responder now employ the SKKE protocol with the 
temporary master key to authenticate each other and establish a shared session key. 
Chapter 5 
Authentication Framework for 
Sensor Networks 
The IEEE 802.15.4 specification defines security primitives for low-power wireless 
devices to provide data confidentiality, message authentication and replay protection. 
Our main objective is to design an authentication mechanism on top of the IEEE 
802.15.4 MAC layer to provide access control and key management. This prohibits 
unauthorized nodes from taking part in activities of the network such as forwarding 
data for other devices as coordinators, responding to a query by spoofing a legitimate 
node, or injecting fabricated packets into the network. 
In order to provide authentication and key management in wireless sensor net-
works, we extend the EAP authentication framework for IEEE 802.15.4 networks. 
However, integrating EAP authentication model into IEEE 802.15.4 networks is a 
challenging task due to smaller MAC frame and multi-hop access network. The IEEE 
802.15.4 MAC PDU leaves only 81 octets for upper layer after enabling MAC layer 
security. This is obviously far below for the existing authentication and key exchange 
protocols commonly used in the Internet such as the EAP-TLS [86] or the IKEv2 
[34]. Note that a single EAP-TLS message can be up to 16 KB in length and the 
IKEv2 needs to support 1280 octets message exchange, which is impractical for IEEE 
802.15.4 devices even if fragmentation and reassembly is used. Furthermore the EAP 
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model assumes supplicants are within the radio range of the authenticator. But in 
IEEE 802.15.4 networks, it is very likely to have devices several hops away from the 
PAN coordinator. Therefore, the EAP authentication model is not directly applicable 
to the IEEE 802.15.4 compliant sensor networks. 
A number of EAP methods has been in-use in different commercial networks, for 
example, the EAP-TLS in the Internet, the Global System for Mobile Communica-
tions (GSM) uses the EAP-SIM [87] and the Universal Mobile Telecommunications 
System (UMTS) and the CDMA2000 networks use the EAP-AKA [88]. Some of them 
are heavyweight and the others are specifically designed for a specific network. We 
propose to use a simple and generalized EAP method that is lightweight for sensor 
network implementation. The GPSK EAP method (EAP-GPSK) [85] discussed in 
Sec. 4.4.2 is the most suitable for resource-poor sensor devices and can be imple-
mented with some optimizations. 
5.1 Components of Proposed Architecture 
The proposed EAP authentication framework consists of an authentication server 
(AS), an authenticator, relay authenticators (RA), and supplicants. We assume the 
PAN coordinator as the authenticator and we define a new role, relay authenticators 
for coordinators. We also assume that there is a pre-established security association 
between the AS and the authenticator. The EAP messages are transported in mesh 
frames in stead of MAC frame because mesh topology and hence mesh routing may be 
required to exchange EAP messages between the authenticator and a supplicant. Fig. 
5.1 shows the components of proposed EAP authentication model for IEEE 802.15.4 
compliant wireless sensor networks. 
Authentication Server 
We propose to use an authentication server, different from the PAN coordinator, to 
authenticate devices during joining the network. It can be a RADIUS server [82] with 
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Figure 5.1: Components of Proposed Authentication Model 
EAP-GPSK protocol configured to use the IEEE 802.15.4 supported cipher suites. 
The server shares 128-bit PSKs with each of the devices in the network. We assume 
that the server has a pre-established security association with the PAN coordinator. 
Authenticator 
We propose to use the PAN coordinator as the authenticator in order to authenticate 
newly joined devices using EAP-GPSK in pass-through mode. The authenticator 
has a pre-established security association with the AS to exchange EAP messages 
securely. After a successful authentication, the authenticator receives the Master 
Session Key (MSK) for the supplicant that took part in the authentication. Upon 
receipt of the MSK, the authenticator and the supplicant execute a 3-way Security 
Association (SA) protocol to establish session keys. The 3-way handshake establishes 
an Auxiliary MSK (AMSK), a Key Encryption Key (KEK) and a Temporal Session 
Key (TK). If the supplicant is authenticated via an RA, the authenticator exports 
the AMSK to the RA securely using previously established security association. The 
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authenticator also derives message encryption key (Kenc) and message authentication 
key (Kmac) from the TK for the supplicant. 
Relay Authenticator 
To enable EAP authentication for IEEE 802.15.4 networks, we define a new role, relay 
authenticator, for devices that act as coordinators. Initially, all devices are configured 
as supplicants. After successful authentication and security association with the PAN 
coordinator, a coodinator changes its role to RA and enables MAC sublayer security. 
An RA accepts EAP messages from its children and forwards to its parent toward the 
PAN coordinator. Before forwarding an EAP message, an RA appends the MIC to the 
message. Thus, messages between two RAs or between the authenticator and the RA 
are cryptographically protected to avoid relaying forged EAP messages. When a child 
of an RA completes EAP authentication and the 3-way handshake successfully, the 
authenticator exports the AMSK securely to the RA. The RA then uses the received 
AMSK to establish session keys with the child by executing the 3-way handshake. 
Supplicant 
All devices in the network except the PAN coordinator need to be authenticated by 
the AS with the help of the PAN coordinator. After link-layer association with a 
coordinator, a supplicant initiates EAP authentication process with its coordinator. 
A supplicant assumes its coordinator as the authenticator and transparently performs 
the EAP authentication. If the coordinator is not the PAN coordinator, it acts as the 
relay authenticator provided that it has been authenticated earlier. After successful 
EAP-GPSK authentication, a supplicant derives the MSK, Extended MSK (EMSK), 
Session Key (SK) and Payload encryption Key (PK) keys and uses the MSK as the 
long term security association with the PAN coordinator. A supplicant then executes 
the 3-way handshake to establish session keys with the PAN coordinator. If the 
supplicant is a coordinator, it changes its role to relay authenticator after establishing 
security association with the PAN coordinator. 
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5.1.1 The Key Hierarchy 
Each device in the network shares a PSK with the AS, which is used as the long term 
security association for authentication only. After a successful authentication, each 
of the devices derives a number of keys for different purposes as shown in Fig. 5.2. 
The EAP-GPSK authentication process derives 4 keys: MSK, EMSK, SK, and 
PK. SK and PK are used during EAP authentication process, the AS exports MSK 
to the PAN coordinator and is used by the peer and the PAN coordinator as the 
long-term security association to derive future session keys. EMSK can be used by 
the authenticator and the supplicant to derive subsequent MSKs without using EAP 
exchanges. 
EMSK 
£ AMSK 
m 
1 
ASK 
, ~T , J I T Z l 
AKmac AKenc 
SK 
X 
Figure 5.2: Proposed Key Hierarchy 
The authenticator and the supplicant then use the 3-way SA protocol to establish 
following keys: AMSK, KEK, and TK. AMSK is not used for supplicants that are 
neighbors to the PAN coordinator and is discarded. KEK is used during security 
association and later for key transports. TK is the session key used for data encryp-
tion and authentication purposes. To avoid using the same key for encryption and 
message authentication, devices derive message encryption key (Kenc) and message 
authentication key (Kmac) from the TK. 
If a device is authenticated via a RA, the authenticator exports the AMSK securely 
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to the RA to be used as the long term security association between the supplicant and 
the RA. The supplicant and the RA then use the same 3-way SA protocol for mutual 
authentication and session key establishment. The RA and the supplicant derive an 
Auxiliary AMSK (A2MSK), an Auxiliary KEK (AKEK) and an Auxiliary TK (ATK) 
to be used as session keys. They also derive Auxiliary Kenc (AKenc) and Auxiliary 
Kmac (AKmac) from the ATK to avoid using the same key for message encryption 
and authentication. Note that auxiliary keys are not derived for supplicants that are 
neighbors to the PAN coordinator; the A2MSK is generated as part of the 3-way SA 
protocol because the same code is reused, which is never used and discarded. 
5.1.2 IEEE 802.15.4 E A P Encapsulation 
We use the IEEE 802.IX EAP over LAN (EAPOL) encapsulation [84] as the basis for 
our EAP encapsulation for LR-WPAN. To enable IEEE 802.15.4 devices to use EAP 
authentication, we use the frame format of Fig. 5.3(a) to carry EAP packets. We 
propose to use a reserved value (e.g. 100) for the Frame Type subfield of the Frame 
Control field of IEEE 802.15.4 MAC header to indicate IEEE 802. IX packets. All 
EAP messages are transported in mesh frames defined in [25] and contain the mesh 
header. 
Fig. 5.3(d) shows the EAP-Key mesh frame format which is used to transport 
cryptographic keys and SA protocol messages. An EAP-Key mesh frame consists of 
a mesh header followed by an IEEE 802. IX header followed by a 1-octet Desc Type 
field which indicates the packet type, a 2-octet Key Length field which indicates the 
length of the key, an 8-octet Replay Counter field which is used to prevent replay 
attack, a 16-octet Key IV field which carries the IV value used to encrypt the key, 
a 1-octet Key Index field which is used to store and retrieve keys, a 16-octet Key 
Signature field which is used to carry signature of the key, an N-octet Key field which 
carries actual key data in encrypted form. 
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Figure 5.3: LoWPAN EAP Encapsulation 
Mesh Header Fields 
We have taken mesh header format from the IETF 6L0WPAN draft [25] as shown in 
Fig. 5.3(b) . The O is a 1-bit field and is set to 0 if the Originator Address is an IEEE 
extended 64-bit address (EUI-64), or to 1 if it is a short 16-bit address. The F is a 
1-bit field and is set to 0 if the Final Destination address is an IEEE extended 64-bit 
address (EUI-64), or to 1 if it is a short 16-bit address. The Hops Left is a 6-bit field 
and is decremented by each forwarding node before sending this frame towards the 
next hop. The frame is not forwarded any further if Hops Left is decremented to 0. 
The Originator Address is the link-layer address of the originator of the mesh frame. 
The Final Destination address is the link-layer address of the intended destination of 
the mesh frame. 
IEEE 802.1X Header Fields 
The IEEE 802.IX header as shown in Fig. 5.3(c) consists of a 1-octet Protocol Version 
field which indicates the protocol version, a 1-octet Packet Type field which indicates 
the type of this EAP packet as shown in Table 5.1, and a 2-octet Packet Length field 
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which contains the length of the packet excluding the IEEE 802.15.4 MAC header, 
the LoWPAN mesh header and the IEEE 802.IX header. 
Packet Type 
0 
1 
2 
3 
EAP Packet 
EAP-Packet 
EAP-Start 
EAP-Logoff 
EAP-Key 
Table 5.1: IEEE 802. IX Types of EAP Packets 
EAP Header Fields 
The EAP header as shown in Fig. 5.3(c), consists of a 1-octet Code field which 
indicates the type of an EAP-Packet as shown in Table 5.2, a 1-octet Identifier field 
which matches the responses with requests, and a 2-octet Length field indicates the 
length of the EAP packet which includes only an EAP header and data field. The 
EAP-Request and EAP-Response packets have another 1-octet Type field after the 
Length field which is used to identify the EAP method being used (see Fig. 5.5). 
Code 
0 
1 
2 
3 
EAP-Packet 
EAP-Request 
EAP-Response 
EAP-Success 
EAP-Failure 
Table 5.2: Different EAP Packets 
5.2 Protocol Operations 
5.2.1 Authenticat ing First Hop Neighbors 
For the first hop neighbors of the PAN coordinator, EAP authentication process 
follows the standard rules of EAP pass-through mode (Sec. 4.4.2). The supplicant 
starts the process by sending a EAP-Start message to the PAN coordinator as shown 
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in Fig. 5.4. Upon receipt of the EAP-Start message from one of its children, the 
PAN coordinator sends an EAP-Request/'Access-Request RADIUS message to the AS 
to begin EAP-GPSK procedure. 
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Figure 5.4: EAP Authentication for PAN Coordinator's Neighbors 
In EAP-Request/GPSK-1 message, the AS sends its identity, a random nonce, 
and an optional list of available cipher suites to the supplicant as shown in Fig. 
5.5. Upon receipt of EAP-Request/'GPSK-1 message from the AS, the supplicant 
generates its own random nonce and derives the 128-bit master key from the server 
ID, server nonce, client ID, and client nonce using the generalized key derivation 
function (GKDF) of the selected cipher suite as follows: 
MK = GKDF16(Q x 00, PL\PSK\CSuite\RndClnt\IdClnt\RndSrv\IdSrv) 
Here, PL represents the length of PSK (16 octets by default), PSK is the pre-
shared key between the AS and the supplicant, CSuite is the selected cipher suite 
(ENC-MIC-64 by default), RndClnt is the client's random nonce, IdClnt is the client's 
ID, RndSrv is the AS's random nonce, and the IdSrv is the authentication server's 
ID. 
The supplicant then derives MSK from the MK using GKDF as follows: 
KeyString = GKDF160(MK,RndClnt\IdClnt\RndSrv\IdSrv) 
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The KDF generates a 160-octet KeyString, where MSK is the left most 64 octets 
(i.e. Key'String[0..63]), EMSK is the next 64 octets (i.e. KeyString[64..127j), SK 
is the next 16 octets (i.e. KeyString[128..143j) and PK is the last 16 octets (i.e. 
KeyString[144..159j). 
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Figure 5.5: EAP-Request/GPSK-1 Packet 
After deriving above keys, the supplicant sends EAP-Response/GPSK-2 message 
to the AS which consists of the client's ID, client's random nonce, selected cipher suite, 
optional PD payload, and a message integrity code (MIC) computed over client's ID, 
client's random nonce, server's ID, server's random nonce, selected cipher suites, and 
optional PD payload, if present, with the SK (see Fig. 5.6). 
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Figure 5.6: EAP-Response/GPSK-2 Packet 
Upon receipt of EAP-Response/GPSK-2 message from the supplicant, the AS 
derives MSK, PMK, SK, and PK as described above and verifies the MIC in the 
message. If EAP-Response/GPSK-2 passes the MIC verification, authentication is 
successful and the AS replies with EAP-Request/GPSK-3 message including server's 
random nonce, client's random nonce, optional PD payload and a MIC computed 
over the client's ID, client's random nonce, selected cipher suites, and optional PD 
payload (if present) with the SK (see Fig. 5.7. When the supplicant receives the 
EAP-Request/GPSK-3 message, it verifies the MIC and if verification succeeds, the 
supplicant assures that the server has established all the keys. 
The supplicant acknowledges EAP-Request/GPSK-3 by sending EAP-Response/ 
GPSK-4 message containing optional PD payload and the MIC of the message (see 
Fig. 5.8). When the server receives the EAP-Response/GPSK-4 message, the au-
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Figure 5.7: EAP-Request/GPSK-3 Packet 
thentication is complete, the AS sends the EAP-Response/Access-Accept RADIUS 
message including the MSK to the PAN coordinator. The authenticator, upon re-
ceipt of the EAF'-Response/Access-Accept RADIUS message and the MSK from the 
AS, sends the EAP-Success message to the supplicant, which indicates that the au-
thenticator possesses the MSK. 
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Figure 5.8: EAP-Response/GPSK-4 Packet 
The 3-Way Security Association The supplicant starts the 3-way Security As-
sociation (SA) protocol with the PAN coordinator by sending the first message (EAP-
Key/SA-1) to the authenticator, which carries SA message number in Descriptor) 
Type, initiator's ID length in Key Length, initiator's ID in Key, and initiator's random 
challenge in Key IV field of EAP-Key packet as shown in Fig. 5.9. Upon receipt of 
the EAP-Key/SA-1 message, the authenticator generates its own random challenge 
and derives AMSK, KEK, and TK from the supplicant's ID, supplicant's random 
challenge, authenticator's ID, authenticator's random challenge using the generalized 
key derivation function (GKDF) with the MSK as follows: 
Key = GKDF16(0 x 00, ML\MSK\DefCS\RndSp\IdSp\RndAu\IdAu) 
KeyString = GKDFU{Key,RndSp\IdSp\RndAu\IdAu) 
Here, ML is the length of MSK, DefCS is the default cipher suite (ENC-MIC-
64), RndSp is the supplicant's random challenge, IdSp is the supplicant's ID, RndAu 
is the authenticator's random challenge, and IdAu is the authenticator's ID. The 
GKDF generates a 64-octet KeyString, where AMSK is the left most 32-octet (i.e. 
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Key String [0.. 31]), KEK is the next 16-octet of the KeyString (i.e. KeyStringfS2..47j) 
and TK is the right most 16-octet of the KeyString (i.e. KeyString[48..63]). 
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Figure 5.9: EAP-Key/SA-1 Packet 
In response to SA-1, the authenticator sends the second message of the 3-way 
handshake (EAP-Key/SA-2) to the supplicant containing of SA message number 
in Desc(riptor) Type, responder's ID length in Key Length, responder's ID in Key, 
responder's random challenge in Key IV, and the MIC computed over initiator's ID, 
initiator's random challenge, responder's ID, and responder's random challenge using 
the KEK in Key Signature field of EAP-Key packet as shown in Fig. 5.10. The 
supplicant derives AMSK, KEK, and TK as described above and verifies the received 
MIC upon receipt of the EAP-Key/SA-2 message. 
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Figure 5.10: EAP-Key/SA-2 Packet 
If MIC verification succeeds, the key exchange is successful and the supplicant 
replies with the final message of the 3-way handshake {EAP-Key/SA-3) containing 
initiator's random challenge in Key IV, responder's random challenge in Key, and 
the MIC of the message computed using the KEK in Key Signature field of EAP-Key 
packet as shown in Fig. 5.11. Note that the Key Length field of EAP-Key/SA-3 
message contains the length of the Key field, i.e. the length of responder's random 
challenge. When the authenticator receives the EAP-Key/SA-3 message from the 
supplicant, authentication is complete and the supplicant and the authenticator derive 
message encryption key (Kenc) and message authentication key (Kmac) from the TK 
as follows: 
KeyString = GKDF32(TK, RndSp\IdSp\RndAu\IdAu) 
Chapter 5. Authentication Framework for Sensor Networks 69 
Here, the KeyString is a 32-octet value and Kenc is the left 16-octet of the 
KeyString (i.e. KeyString[0.. 15]) and Kmac is the right 16-octet of the KeyString (i.e. 
KeyString[16..31J). Note that if the supplicant is a coordinator, then it changes its 
role to RA after successful authentication and key exchange. The AMSK is discarded 
by the authenticator and the supplicant if the supplicant is the first-hop neighbor of 
the authenticator. 
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5.2.2 Authenticating Distant Nodes 
Supplicants that are 2 or more hops away from the PAN coordinator use an RA to get 
authenticated. The coordinator of the supplicant acts as the RA for the supplicant 
provided that the coordinator has already been authenticated and established security 
association with the PAN coordinator. Fig. 5.12 illustrates the authentication and key 
exchange mechanisms for supplicants that are not neighbors of the PAN coordinator. 
After completing association procedure with a coordinator, a node starts the EAP 
authentication by sending the EAP-Start message to its coordinator. The coordinator 
acts as the RA for the supplicant and forwards the EAP-Start message toward the 
PAN coordinator encapsulating in a mesh frame. Note that the RA inserts its own 
address into the frame and appends MIC to the mesh frame computed with the Kmac 
key shared with the PAN coordinator in order to protect the frame from in-flight 
tampering. The RA also applies MAC sublayer authentication mechanism before 
forwarding the frame to its parent to prevent malicious node from injecting false EAP 
frames into the network or replaying old frames. The intermediate nodes along the 
path employ MAC sublayer security mechanism to exchange EAP messages securely 
between the supplicant and the PAN coordinator. In order to deliver EAP messages 
to the PAN coordinator, intermediate nodes forward the message to their parents. 
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Figure 5.12: EAP Authentication for Distant Nodes 
They also set the reverse path to the supplicant by inserting an entry into the mesh 
routing table. 
When the authenticator receives an EAP-Start message from an RA, it verifies 
the MIC and if the message passes the MIC verification, the authenticator saves the 
addresses of the RA and the supplicant and sends an EAP-Request/Access-Request 
RADIUS message for the supplicant to the AS. The AS and the supplicant then 
perform EAP-GPSK exchanges to authenticate each other and derive EMSK, MSK, 
SK, and PK as described in section 5.2.1. The messages in reverse direction, from 
the PAN coordinator to the RA, are also transported in mesh frames and protected 
using MAC sublayer security mechanism. Upon successful EAP authentication, the 
AS sends the MSK securely to the PAN coordinator. The PAN coordinator and the 
supplicant then execute the 3-way SA protocol to derive AMSK, KEK, and TK as 
described in section 5.2.1. 
For supplicants that use RA for EAP authentication, the PAN coordinator exports 
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the AMSK to the RA after successful key establishment with the supplicant. The 
PAN coordinator uses EAP-Key mesh frame as shown in Fig. 5.3(d) to transport 
the AMSK to the RA. The key is encrypted using the KEK shared between the PAN 
coordinator and the RA, the IV value used in encryption and a signature of the key 
are included in the EAP-Key mesh frame. An EAP-Key mesh frame is also protected 
by using MAC sublayer security mechanism along the path from the PAN coordinator 
to the RA. The RA, on reception of the key frame, decrypts the key and verifies the 
signature of the key before accepting it. If the signature verification succeeds, the 
RA accepts the key and initiates the same 3-way SA handshake with the supplicant 
to derive auxiliary keys: AMSK, AKEK and ATK. The auxiliary key establishment 
process uses the same process as described in section 5.2.1. The RA and supplicant 
also derive AKenc and AKmac from the ATK. The A2MSK is derived as part of the 
3-way handshake because the same code is reused and is discarded by the RA and 
the supplicant. 
5.2.3 Mutual Authentication 
In order to establish security association between any two nodes inside the PAN, we 
use the triangular symmetric-key authenticated key agreement protocol used in [59]. 
The source node sends an authentication request to the PAN coordinator for the 
intended destination. The source node uses authenticated mesh frame for sending 
authentication request. It computes MIC over the authentication request message 
using the shared authentication key with the PAN coordinator. The PAN coordi-
nator verifies the authentication request and then checks whether the destination is 
authentic or not. If the destination is not an authentic node (i.e. the destination has 
not been authenticated with the PAN coordinator), it replies with an authentication 
failure message, otherwise the PAN coordinator generates a temporary key agreement 
key and sends the key securely to both the source and the destination nodes. The 
PAN coordinator uses EAP-Key mesh frame to transport the key encrypted using 
the KEK shared with the source or the destination; it also appends a signature of the 
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key to the EAP-Key mesh frame. EAP-Key mesh frame is also protected by using 
MAC sublayer security mechanism along the path from the PAN coordinator to the 
source or the destination node. When the source node receives the temporary key 
agreement key, it knows that the destination is authentic and initiates the 3-way SA 
protocol with the destination and establishes session keys as described in Sec. 5.2.1. 
5.3 Implementation Issues 
Sensor devices have very little amount of computing resources such as 8 or 16-bit 
processor, few kilo bytes of RAM, few hundred bytes of instruction memory, low 
bandwidth radio, and more importantly limited battery power. Thus designing any 
protocol for sensor network must consider the resource utilization and keep resource 
requirement as low as possible. The authentication framework we have designed in 
this thesis is based on the extensible authentication protocol which was originally 
designed to be used in commercial networks. Therefore there is a strong need to 
adopt it so that it keeps resource utilization to a minimum. 
We have proposed following optimizations to the EAP-GPSK implementation to 
keep GPSK messages as small as possible so that each of them can be transported in 
a single IEEE 802.15.4 MAC frame. The EAP-GPSK uses NAI as the Client ID and 
Server ID, which can be up to 256 octets in length and we propose to use sensor node's 
IEEE 64-bit extended MAC address as the Client ID and the IPv6 address of the 
AS as the Server ID. The EAP-GPSK uses 32-octet random numbers, which is too 
large for sensor networks and we propose to use 16-octet random numbers instead 
of 32-octet. In addition, an EAP peer repeats the Server ID and server's random 
number in GPSK-2 message, which increases the packet length significantly and we 
propose not to repeat them in GPSK-2, just use them in MIC computation. Finally, 
we propose to minimize cipher suite list to IEEE 802.15.4 standard cipher suites and 
use the ENC-MIC-64 cipher suite as the default cipher suite. 
We propose that the supplicant starts the process in order to minimize communi-
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cation overheads by avoiding a pair of EAP-Request/Response messages. In addition, 
when a distant node joins the network, the PAN coordinator is unaware of that and 
cannot initiate EAP authentication. 
Since we are using the IEEE 802.15.4 security primitives for encryption, message 
authentication, and replay protection, our authentication framework implements only 
the EAP state machine partially, the GPSK protocol, and the 3-way SA protocol. We 
use the same key derivation function for deriving GPSK keys and SA keys. We have 
implemented the security framework as an NS-2 module and then converted the NS-2 
code for TinyOS and compiled for Tmote. 
We have implemented the supplicant functionalities in approximately 1800 lines 
of NS-2 C++ code including debugging codes. For relay authenticator functionalities, 
it requires about 2000 lines of NS-2 C++ code including debugging codes. In nesC, 
we have implemented the supplicant functionality in about 1500 lines of code, the 
relay authenticator functionality with about 1700 lines of code, and authenticator 
function with approximately 1400 lines of code. Note that TinySec implementation 
requires about 3000 lines of nesC code, which includes encryption and authentication 
primitives. After compilation for Tmote, it requires about 14 KB of program space 
and less than 2 KB of RAM for data structures. Thus the proposed solution can 
be implemented on sensor devices like Mica2, TelosB, or Tmote and can be used in 
many sensor network applications such as medical monitoring and meter readings for 
utility services. 
5.4 Simulation Results 
We have simulated the proposed security protocol using NS-2 for performance evalu-
ation. We have implemented the protocol as the mesh sublayer on top of the MAC 
sublayer and below the IP layer. We have also implemented the MAC layer security 
primitives as defined in [9] because the NS-2 module for IEEE 802.15.4 did not im-
plement security primitives. We have simulated the protocol with the IEEE 802.15.4 
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MAC protocol in beacon enabled mode for estimating the amount of time it takes 
to complete EAP authentication for nodes at different hops away. We have used the 
CMU's emu-scene-gen utility for generating topologies randomly. The area of the 
network has been chosen based on the number of nodes in the network so that the 
network has been connected. We ran the simulation for several times and took the 
average with nodes at 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 hops away from the authenticator. Among 
the parameters evaluated are the time it takes to authenticate, to establish an SA, to 
transport the keys, etc. For each parameter a figure is obtained. The X-axis in the 
figures below represents the hop count and the Y-axis represents the amount of time 
in milliseconds. 
We have plotted the average time requirements for GPSK authentication, SA 
handshake, and key transport after running several times. In different simulation runs, 
the variation of time requirement was small, for example, for GPSK authentication 
for first-hop neighbors the best case was 71 ms whereas the worst case was 80 ms. 
The maximum variation for GPSK authentication in all cases was 9 ms, for security 
association 5 ms, and for key transport 4 ms. 
300-
250-
200-
I 
o 150-
E 
P 
100-
60-
2 3 4 
Hop Count 
j 6 
Figure 5.13: EAP-GPSK Authentication Time 
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5.4.1 EAP-GPSK Authentication Time 
The amount of time it takes to complete the EAP-GPSK exchange is estimated 
beginning at the time when a node sends the EAP-Start message and ending at the 
time when it receives the EAP-Success message. Fig. 5.13 shows the simulation time 
it takes to complete the EAP-GPSK authentication for nodes at different hops away 
from the authenticator. 
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Figure 5.14: 3-Way Security Association Time 
5.4.2 3-Way Security Association Time 
The amount of time it takes to complete the 3-way security association is calculated 
from the time when a node sends the first message to the time when the authenticator 
completes processing the third message. Fig. 5.14 shows the simulation result for 
completing the 3-way SA protocol for nodes at different hops away from the PAN 
coordinator. 
5.4.3 Key Transport Time 
For distant nodes, the PAN coordinator exports the AMSK key to the RA after 
completing the 3-way handshake with the supplicant so that the RA can authenticate 
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Figure 5.15: Key Transport Time 
the supplicant and establish session keys using the 3-way handshake. This time varies 
for nodes that are different hops away from the PAN coordinator and contributes to 
the total authentication time. Fig. 5.15 shows the simulation results for transporting 
AMSK securely to RAs 
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Figure 5.16: Network Access Time 
5.4.4 Network Access Time 
To get access to the network a node needs to get authenticated and to establish 
security association with the PAN coordinator. For distant nodes, they also need 
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to establish security association with their relay authenticators (i.e. coordinators). 
Therefore, the network access time for PAN coordinator's first hop neighbors is the 
total of the EAP-GPSK time and a 3-way SA time. But for distant nodes, the network 
access time is the total of the EAP-GPSK time, a 3-way SA time, the key transport 
time and another 3-way handshake time. Fig. 5.16 shows the simulation results for 
network access time. 
Chapter 6 
Conclusions 
Medical monitoring based on wireless sensor networking can provide better quality of 
medical care by exploiting low-cost, mobile, continuous, real-time, flexible and self-
organizing properties of wireless sensor networks. IP enabled sensor networks have 
many advantages over classical sensor networks such as wide interoperability, exist-
ing security, naming, addressing, name-resolution, service discovery, network man-
agement, and reliability. However, due to limited resources of sensor devices, IP 
integration faces a number of challenges such as transporting large IP packets over 
small link-layer frames, inefficient routing and transport protocols, heavyweight secu-
rity protocols etc. and requires optimization to save scarce resources of sensor devices 
(e.g. battery power, memory, bandwidth, etc.). The IETF 6L0WPAN working group 
has defined message formats and adaptation layer for transporting IPv6 packets over 
the IEEE 802.15.4 radio and MAC protocols, the de facto standard for wireless sensor 
networks. 
In this thesis, we have presented an optimized broadcast tree construction algo-
rithm for efficient flooding in the mesh of sensor devices and adapted on-demand 
unicast and multicast routing algorithms to use the broadcast tree for flooding; an 
efficient reliable transport protocol based on hop-by-hop error recovery; and finally a 
security architecture for authentication and key management for sensor devices using 
IEEE 802.15.4 security primitives. We have devised the solution to save memory 
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by reusing existing security primitives, to reduce communications overhead to save 
energy and improve scalability. 
First, we have shown that real-time medical monitoring using wireless sensor net-
works is feasible by implementing a wireless EEG system with TinyOS based sensor 
nodes. We have also shown that it is possible to incorporate machine intelligence 
algorithms to make decisions based on sensor readings. Since medical monitoring 
requires reliable delivery of sensor readings (e.g. heart-rate, blood-pressure, EKG 
readings, etc.), we have presented a reliable data transport protocol for sensor net-
works. The reliable transport performs hop-by-hop error recovery by using a modified 
selective repeat protocol with small sized window. We have simulated the protocol 
using the TinyOS simulator (TOSSIM) for performance evaluation and shown that 
the hop-by-hop technique performs better than end-to-end technique in highly error 
prone wireless sensor networks. 
Second, we have developed an optimized broadcast tree construction algorithm 
based on minimum connected dominating set heuristics for wireless sensor networks. 
The algorithm produces smaller forward node sets than that of existing broadcast 
algorithms using only one-hop neighborhood information. We have adapted the on-
demand multicast routing algorithm optimized for sensor networks to employ the 
broadcast tree for efficient flooding of control messages. We have simulated the broad-
cast and multicast tree construction algorithms using NS-2 with IEEE 802.15.4 MAC 
protocol. Our simulation results showed that the communication and time complexi-
ties for the creation of broadcast tree are linear to the number of nodes in the network. 
Finally, we have designed the security architecture on top of the IEEE 802.15.4 
security primitives for authentication and key management in wireless medical sensor 
networks. Since IEEE 802.15.4 standard provides data confidentiality, authenticity, 
and replay protection with symmetric-key cryptography, we have designed the au-
thentication and key management protocols based on symmetric-key cryptography to 
reuse the available codes. We have extended the 3-party EAP authentication model 
for the multi-hop access network of IEEE 802.15.4. 
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We implemented an optimized version of the EAP-GPSK authentication protocol 
for authenticating sensor nodes before joining the network. For this purpose, we have 
denned EAP encapsulation over the IEEE 802.15.4 WPAN and key hierarchy for 
sensor devices. We have used the 3-way security association handshake mechanism for 
key establishment between any pair of nodes in the network. We have simulated the 
security protocol using the NS2 for performance study. Simulation results showed that 
the EAP authentication time in multi-hop access networks increases linearly as the 
number of hops increases. The major drawback of using EAP authentication in multi-
hop access networks is the communications overhead since intermediate nodes have to 
retransmit EAP messages in either direction from the supplicant to the authenticator 
and vice-versa and it increases with number of hops. 
6.1 Limitations 
The main drawback of the broadcast tree construction algorithm is that it considers 
only the degree of neighbors for selecting forwarders and does not consider link quality 
and other path selection metric. The reliable transport protocol proposed in this 
thesis considers error recovery and congestion control. However, sensor networks 
require real-time delivery of sensor readings and not investigated in this thesis. 
A number of limitations of the security architecture needs to be reconsidered for 
performance improvements. The major drawback of the design is the requirement of 
sequential authentication, i.e. a distant node cannot be authenticated until its parent 
is authenticated. The use of MAC address or IPv6 address as NAI also requires 
further consideration because this necessitates the authenticator to know the address 
of the AS for supplicants which is not the case in traditional EAP model. Another 
important issue not considered in this thesis and needs to be resloved is the broadcast 
authentication mechanism. Finally, the security architecture is designed for medical 
monitoring applications, therefore, it is not clear whether it is directly applicable for 
other sensor network applications and it requires further research. 
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6.2 Future Work 
The routing algorithms presented in this thesis do not consider the dynamic con-
cerns such as path selection metrics for selecting good paths from the source to the 
destination, routing table size limitations and link asymmetries because they are 
implementation-oriented but important in sensor networks. In IEEE 802.15.4 based 
sensor networks such concerns have greater impacts on the designs than other wire-
less networks and thus we leave such investigations for further research. Important 
future work may include performance evaluation under diverse mobility patterns and 
asymmetric links. In our experiments we used a sliding window protocol to ensure 
reliable message delivery and congestion control, which require further research for 
wireless sensor networks. 
We have studied the performance of the proposed security protocol only in static 
environment, it is necessary to study the protocol performance in mobile environments 
especially in cluster architecture. It is important to secure IPv6 neighbor discov-
ery messages and the broadcast and multicast tree construction messages, however 
existing broadcast authentication protocols are not suitable for low-power wireless 
sensor networks. Further research needs to be done to provide lightweight solutions 
to broadcast authentication. Most importantly, we have studied our protocols under 
constrained simulation environments and needs to be evaluated in real sensor deploy-
ment. Since now IPv6 enables sensor devices are in the market, the performance of 
the proposed solutions can be evaluated in real IPv6 enabled wireless sensor networks. 
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Appendix A 
Users Manual 
The simulation modules, optimized broadcast and multicast tree construction algo-
rithms for efficient mesh routing in IEEE 802.15.4 networks and authentication and 
key exchange protocol for IPv6 enabled medical sensor networks, are written for NS-
2.29 and run under Linux, Unix or Cygwin platforms. These implementations are 
the outcome of the master's thesis A Security Architecture for IPv6 Enabled Medical 
Sensor Networks and tested under Linux with NS-2.29. 
A. l Installing Modules 
In the following, it is assumed that the NS-2 distribution ns-allinone-2.29 is installed 
in /ns2.29 directory and tested that it works properly. 
• Extract thesis.tgz into /ns2.29/ns-2.29/ directory using tar -xvzf thesis, tgz 
• Compile NS-2 with the make command in /ns2.29/ns-2.29 directory 
This will create two directories mesh and security in the /ns2.29/ns-2.29 direc-
tory. The /ns2.29/ns-2.29/mesh directory contains all the source files of mesh rout-
ing protocol and the /ns2.29/ns-2.29/security directory contains all the source files of 
the security protocol. It also replaces the /ns2.29/ns-2.29/Makefile, the /ns2.29/ns-
2.29/common/packet.h, the /ns2.29/ns-2.29/queue/priqueue.cc, the /ns2.29/ns-2.29 
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/trace/emu-trace, h, the /ns2.29/ns-2.29/trace/emu-trace.cc, the /ns2.29/ns-2.29/tcl 
/lib/ns-default.tcl, the /ns2.29/ns-2.29/tcl/lib/ns-lib.tcl and the /ns2.29/ns-2.29/tcl/ 
lib/ns-packet.tcl. Both the /ns2.29/ns-2.29/mesh and /ns2.29/ns-2.29/'security di-
rectories have sub-directories test, which contain sample simulation scripts. 
A.2 Simulating Routing Protocols 
A sample simulation script mesh.demo.tcl along with a deployment topology mesh-de-
mo.scn is given for optimized broadcast tree construction and on-demand multicast 
tree construction algorithm simulation. To run the simulation, change the current 
directory to the /ns2.29/ns-2.29/mesh and issue the command /ns2.29/ns-2.29/ns 
mesh-demo. tcl. The simulation will print nodes status for broadcast and multicast 
trees while save the trace records in the mesh-demo, tr file to be used for performance 
study. 
In order to customize a new simulation, one needs to generate a new topology 
using the CMU's scene generator utility, for example, setdest -n 15 -p 100 -s 0.0 -t 
100 -x 50 -y 50 test.scn creates a topology of 15 nodes in a 50 x 50 grid with no 
mobility and save into the test.scn file. 
Now modify the mesh-demo, tcl simulation script according to your requirements. 
The line set val(rp) Mesh indicates that we are going to simulate mesh routing pro-
tocol, i.e. optimized broadcast tree and multicast tree constructions algorithms. The 
set val(nn) 15 indicates network size, set val(x) and set val(y) indicate the area 
of the field. Use the source test.scn command to include the topology generated 
using cmu-scene-gen utility. The $ns. at (time) [$node-({nodeid)) agent 255] pan-
coordinator starts the optimized broadcast tree construction process. The $ns. at 
(time) [$node-((nodeid)) agent 255] print-status is used to display the status of nodes 
after broadcast tree construction. The command $ns- at (time) f$node-((nodeid)) 
agent 255] mcast-group is used to set group membership of a node. Note that we use 
only one multicast group at a time. The command $ns- at (time) [$node-((nodeid)) 
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agent 255] mcast-source is used to initiate the multicast tree formation process. Fi-
nally, the command $ns. at (time) f$node.($i) agent 255] print-group-status can be 
used to display nodes status after a multicast tree construction. Now, you can run 
the new simulation and analyze the simulation results by examining the mesh-demo.tr 
trace file. 
A.3 Simulating Security Protocol 
A sample simulation script sec.demo.tcl along with a topology sec.demo.scn and 
a node configuration file nodes.cfg is given for simulating the authentication and 
key exchange protocol. To run the simulation, change the current directory to the 
/ns2.29/ns-2.29/security and issue the command /ns2.29/ns-2.29/ns sec-demo.tcl. 
The simulation will print nodes activity during authentication and key exchange 
on the screen while save the trace records in the sec.demo.tr file to be used for 
performance study. 
In order to customize a new simulation, one can generate a new topology using the 
CMU's scene generator utility, for example, setdest -n 15 -p 100 -s 0.0 -t 100 -x 50 -y 
50 test, sen creates a topology of 15 nodes in a 50 x 50 grid with no mobility and save 
into the test.sen file. Note that we assume that node 0 acts as the PAN coordinator 
and hence the authenticator and that the node 1 acts as the EAP authentication server 
and are within the radio range of each other for simplicity. Write a configuration file 
for initializing nodes with bootstraping information (see the nodes.cfg for formats). 
Note that some pieces of the bootstraping information can be obtained from the IEEE 
802.15.4 association procedure e.g. Node's short address, PAN coordinator's address, 
coordinator's address, chlidren count and children addresses while others need to be 
configured prior to deployment, e.g. the pre-shared key, authentication server's ID. 
All nodes are initialized to supplicant except the PAN coordinator which is initialized 
to authenticator and the authentication server. To simplify the implementation, we 
use the configuration file instead of obtaining from the link-layer. 
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Now modify the sec.demo.tcl for customized simulation. The command $ns~ at 
(time) [$node.((nodeid)) agent 255] eapconfig /ns2.29/ns-2.29/security/test/nodes.cfg 
is used to configure nodes with bootstraping information from nodes, cfg file. The 
command $ns. at (time) [$node.((nodeid)) agent 255J eapstart is used to start au-
thentication and key exchange process for node 2 with the authentication server. Now, 
you can run the new simulation and analyze the simulation results by examining the 
sec-demo.tr trace file. 
Appendix B 
Simplified R D T Sender 
N = buff_size; 
seqno = start_seq; 
end_seq = start_seq + ceil(sizeof(app_data) / packet_size); 
while(seqno <= end_seq){ 
switch(event){ 
case: application data received 
make RDT packets from app_data; 
start timer; 
send N packets with sequence no. starting from seqno; 
break; 
case: timer timeout 
retransmit N packets with sequence no. starting from seqno; 
restart timer; 
break; 
case: ACK received with values x and y 
retransmit packets with seqno between x and y; 
restart timer; 
break; 
case: BUFFER FULL received 
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seqno = seqno + N; 
stop timer; 
if(this is an intermediate node){ 
send BUFFER EMPTY to its preceding node; 
change state to RDT receiver; 
} 
break; 
case: BUFFER EMPTY received 
start timer; 
send N packets with sequence no. starting from seqno; 
break; 
} 
} 
Appendix C 
Simplified R D T Receiver 
N = buff_size; 
seqno = start_seq; 
end_seq = start_seq + ceiKsizeof (app_data) / packet_size) 
last_seq = start_seq; 
while(seqno <= end_seq){ 
switch(event){ 
case: RDT packets received 
if(not corrupted and in-order){ 
buffer packet; 
start timer; 
acksent = false; 
} 
else if(not corrupted and out-of-order){ 
buffer packet; 
send ACK with seqno of last in-order and this packet; 
acksent = true; 
start timer; 
} 
else if(corrupted){ 
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send ACK with seqno of last in-order packet; 
acksent = true; 
start timer; 
} 
if(buffer is full){ 
send BUFFER FULL packet; 
seqno = seqno + N; 
stop timer; 
if(it is destination) 
send BUFFER EMPTY packet; 
else 
change state to RDT Sender; 
} 
break; 
case: timer timeout 
if(not acksent){ 
send ACK with seqno of last in-order packet; 
start timer; 
acksent = true; 
} 
else{ 
retransmit ACK packet; 
start timer; 
} 
break; 
} 
} 
Appendix D 
List of Acronyms 
A2MSK - Auxiliary AMSK 
ACK - Acknowledgement 
ADC - Analog to Digital Converter 
ADMR - Adaptive Demand Driven Multicast Routing 
AES - Advanced Encryption Standard 
AES-CCM - AES with CBC in Counter Mode 
AKenc - Auxiliary Kenc 
AKmac - Auxiliary Kmac 
AMSK - Auxiliary MSK 
AODV - Ad-hoc On-demand Distant Vector 
APS - Application Layer 
AS - Authentication Server 
ATK - Auxiliary TK 
BCAST - Broadcast 
BP - Blood Pressure 
CBC - Cipher Block Chaining CBQ - CodeBlue Query 
CCM - CBC in Counter Mode 
CDMA - Code Division Multiple Access 
CF - Classical Flooding 
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CFB - Cipher Feedback 
CMAC - Cipher based Message Authentication Code 
CPU - Central Processing Unit 
CRC - Cyclic Redundancy Check 
CTS - Clear to Send 
DAC - Digital to Analog Converter 
DAD - Duplicate Address Detection 
DEAL - Data Encryption Algorithm with Larger block 
DES - Data Encryption Standard 
DH - Diffie-Hellman 
DMA - Dynamic Memory Allocation 
DNS - Domain Name System 
DoS - Denial of Service 
DSDV - Destination Sequenced Distance Vector 
DSR - Dynamic Source Routing 
DYMO - Dynamic MANET On-demand 
EAP - Extensible Authentication Protocol 
EAP-AKA - EAP - Authentication and Key Agreement 
EAP-GPSK - EAP - Generalized Pre-shared Key 
EAP-SIM - EAP - GSM Subscriber Identity Module 
EAP-TLS - EAP - Transport Layer Security 
EAPOL - EAP over LAN 
EAX - Encryption and Authentication mode 
ECB - Electronic Codebook 
ECC - Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
ECDH - Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman 
ECDSA - Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm 
EC-MQV - Elliptic Curve Menezes-Qu-Vanstone 
EEG - Electroencephalogram 
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EKG - Electocardiogram 
EMSK - Extended MSK 
ENC - Encryption 
ESRT - Event to Sink Reliable Transport 
EUI - Extended Unique Identifier 
FFD - Full Function Device 
GCM - Galois/Counter Mode 
GKDF - Generalized KDF 
GSM - Global Systems for Mobile Communications 
HC - Header Compression 
HMAC - Hashed Message Authentication Code 
HTTP - Hyper-Text Transfer Protocol 
I2C - Inter Integrated Circuit 
ICA - Independent Component Analysis 
ICMP - Internet Control Message Protocol 
IDEA - International Data Encryption Algorithm 
IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
IETF - Internet Engineering Task Force 
IID - Interface Identifier 
IKE - Internet Key Exchange 
IKEv2 - IKE version 2 
IP - Internet Protocol 
IPSec - IP Security 
IPv6 - Internet Protocol version 6 
ISM - Industrial, Scientific and Medical 
IV - Initialization Vector 
KDF - Key Derivation Function 
KEK - Key Encryption Key 
Kenc - Session key for Encryption 
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Kmac - Session key for Authentication 
LAN - Local Area Network 
LDR - Link Delivery Ratio 
LOAD - 6L0WPAN Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector Routing 
LoWPAN - Low power Wireless Personal Area Network 
LQI - Link Quality Indicator 
6L0WPAN - IPv6 for Low power Wireless Personal Area Network 
LR-WPAN - Low-Rate Wireless Personal Area Network 
filP - Micro Internet Protocol 
MAC - Medium Access Control 
MAODV - Multicast AODV 
MANET - Mobile Ad hoc Network 
MCAST - Multicast 
MCDS - Minimum Connected Dominating Set 
MD5 - Message Digest version 5 
MIC - Message Integrity Code 
MFCC - Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficient 
MPR - Mutipoint Relay 
MSK - Master Session Key 
NA - Neighbor Advertisement 
NACK - Negative Acknowledgement 
NAI - Network Access Identifier 
NAS - Network Access Server 
NAT - Network Address Translator 
NDP - Neighbor Discovery Protocol 
NEMO - Network Mobility 
NS - Neighbor Solicitation 
NS-2 - Network Simulator version 2 
NUD - Neighbor Unreachability Detection 
APPENDIX D. LIST OF ACRONYMS 
NWK - Network Layer 
ODMRP - On-demand Multicast Routing Protocol 
OFB - Output Feedback 
OLSR - Optimized Link State Routing 
PDA - Personal Digital Assistant 
PDR - Path Delivery Ratio 
PAN - Personal Area Network 
PANC - PAN Coordinator 
PDU - Protocol Data Unit 
PHY - Physical Layer 
PK - Payload Encryption Key 
PORT - Price Oriented Reliable Transport 
POS - Personal Operating Space 
PSFQ - Pump Slowly, Fetch Quickly 
PSK - Preshared Key 
RA - Relay Authenticator 
RADIUS - Remote Authentication Dial In User Service 
RAM - Random-Access Memory 
RC - block cipher (Rivest Cipher) 
RDT - Reliable Data Transport 
RFD - Reduced Function Device 
RISC - Reduced Instruction Set Computer 
RMST - Reliable Multi-Segment Transport 
RREP - Route Reply 
RREQ - Route Request 
RERR - Route Error 
RSA - public cryptography (Rivest, Shamir and Adleman) 
RTS - Request to Send 
SAA - Stateless Address Autoconfiguration 
APPENDIX D. LIST OF ACRONYMS 
SHA - Secure Hash Algorithm 
SNEP - Secure Network Encryption Protocol 
SK - Session Key 
SKKE - Symmetric Key Key Exchange 
SPI - Serial Peripheral Interface 
SPINS - Security Protocols for Sensor Networks 
SR - Selective Repeat 
SSL - Secure Socket Layer 
TCP - Transmission Control Protocol 
TESLA - Timed, Efficient, Streaming, Loss-tolerant Authentication 
//TESLA - Micro TESLA 
TK - Temporal Key 
UART - Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter 
UDP - User Datagram Protocol 
UMTS - Universal Mobile Telephone System 
Wi-Fi - Wireless Fidelity (WLAN) 
WLAN - Wireless Local Area Network 
WPAN - Wireless Personal Area Network 
WSN - Wireless Sensor Network 
